CECOM History Program: Special Study 96-1
United States Army Communications-Electronics Command
The Salomon Years
11 February 1994 - 31 March 1996
Richard Bingham, Command Historian
US Army Communications-Electronics Command
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
11 April 1996
Introduction by Major General Gerard P. Brohm ii
The Communications-Electronics Command 1
Mission and Vision 1
Structures and Resources 3
Reshape II 8
Technology 10 Scope and Significance 10
The Digital Integrated Laboratory 16
The Battle Labs and Warfighting Experiments 18
Advanced Technology Demonstrations and Other Technical Achievements 19
Technology Applied to Logistics 23
Quality Improvement 25
Customer Service 26
Teaming for Change 27
Electronic Contracting (Paperless Procurement) 31
Omnibus Contracts 31
The Order Officer Program 32
Pacer Procurements 33
The Lead Time Reduction Red Team 36
The Standardization Program Team 36
Training, Performance, and Commitment 37
The War on Drugs 39
Earthquake ad Northridge 39
The Balkans 41
Commanders of CECOM Attachment 1
The LRC Story: Going Beyond Expectations Attachment 2
"Telecommunications for Haiti" Attachment 3
Chronology of CECOM Joint Endeavor Support Actions Attachment 4
By MG Gerard P. Brohm
US Army Communications-Electronics Command
When I took command of CECOM and Fort Monmouth a year ago last January, I knew that I was joining a team of enthusiastic professionals with a sharp focus on dedicated service to American soldiers in the field. Since then, I have become increasingly proud of the tremendous scope of the work accomplished by all the elements of Team Fort Monmouth. It has been exciting and gratifying to see first hand the outstanding capabilities of the individuals and organization on this team.
When the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Reimer, visited here last August, he said in his concluding remarks that he was impressed by the competence and commitments of CECOM's civilians and soldiers. He said that the Army is especially fortunate to have such a great civilian work force, and on behalf of soldiers everywhere, he thanks us all for all that we do every day to make the Army better.
Because of the outstanding capabilities we possess as a world class center of excellence for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors (C4IEWS), I am convinced that in a very real sense the efforts of the civilians and soldiers of Team Fort Monmouth represent the future of the Army.
With the Army's focus on creating a Force to meet the needs of the 21st Century battlefield, it is quite clear that the most important feature of the Army of the future (Force XXI) will be its ability to exploit information technology. And that's where we excel with our unique C4IEWS expertise as part of the Army team. Team Fort Monmouth is providing the building blocks for Force XXI through our cooperative efforts with the Army's Battle Labs and through our active participation and leadership in Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) and Advanced Technology Demonstration.
We have played a key enabling role in AWEs such as Focused Dispatch and Warrior Focus, which are designed to get the Army ready for the Task Force XXI War Fighting Experiment to be conducted in February 1997 at the National Training Center. The CECOM Research, Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC) has been designated the Army's system engineer with major responsibility for the technical architecture supporting Force XXI. The Program Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communications Systems (PEO-C3S) has been given responsibility for development of the systems architecture and has the lead for Task Force XXI integration efforts. And we take great pride in the fact that the RDEC Digital Integrated Laboratory is the Army's focal point for testing equipment and concepts before they are demonstrated in the Task Force XXI Warfighting Experiment.
All the organization of Team Fort Monmouth mesh into a well-integrated entity whose coordinated efforts span the entire C4IEWS system life cycle from invention, with the work being done by the Army Research Laboratory and the RDEC, through sustainment, provided by the Logistics and Readiness Center. We can quite literally say that we are building tomorrow's Army today while at the same time sustaining today's Army every day.
While keeping the Army on the Force XXI course set by the Chief of Staff, we're also working more closely with other military services on joint service systems and programs. We are defining the future course of our national defense in our role as the Executive Agent for Joint Task Force Communications Network Management Systems and through our efforts in programs such as Joint Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistics Support, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Global Positioning Systems (GPS), the Defense Satellite Communications System, and MILSTAR.
To better support the Army and the other services in this era of rapid technology modernization, our Acquisition Center has taken the lead among all Defense Department acquisition organization in its streamlining of procurement services and in its implementation of innovative contracting methods. Initiatives like the Electronic Bulletin Board System, Omnibus Contracting, and Pacer Acquisitions have helped "push the envelope" so that we acquire and support systems more rapidly and efficiently. That means better service to our most important customer -- our soldiers in the field.
As to the future: the pace will become even more hectic, but the rewards will be all the greater because of the critical importance of C4IEWS to the Army and all the other services. To meet the challenges of the Twenty-First Century, we must have a strong, well-integrated team of skilled and committed civilians and soldiers. This team is here now, at Fort Monmouth, and it has already proved its worth many times over during the past several years. What it does every day has a dramatic effect on the lives of the men and women who proudly wear the uniforms of the Armed Services, and it is providing these brave young men and women the technological edge they need to win on any battlefield and return home safely.
The Communications-Electronics Command
Mission and Vision
With characteristic flourish, the managers of CECOM constructed the following statement of the commandís "vision":
CECOM is a world class organization of quality soldiers and civilians who provide and sustain technologically superior and integrated command, control, communications, computer, intelligence and electronic warfare (C4IEW) systems that will enable our forces world-wide to communicate, command and control, own the night, own the spectrum, and know the enemy.
And the following statement of its "mission":
Provide integrated, timely, cost effective and high quality production, and worldwide logistics support; enhance a trained and ready Army; provide research, development, acquisition, and logistics support to Program Executive Officers and Project Managers through superior acquisitions; develop, acquire, test, and evaluate non-major systems and equipment; define, integrate, acquire and apply superior technologies through quality Technology Base Program Management; provide quality technical support to the AMC Core Competencies (Technology Generation and Application, Logistics Power Projection, and Acquisition Excellence); enhance the quality of life for our soldiers, family members, and civilians.
Having been named lead organization for four of the "critical long-range initiatives" AMC proposed in November 1993 -- "Digitizing the Battlefield," "Enhanced Survivability/Force Protection," "Own the Electromagnetic Spectrum," and "Own the Night" -- CECOM identified for itself its five "major business areas":
Communications: "Efforts supporting Army tactical communications (including jamming resistant airborne, ground, and satellite transmission capabilities) to provide Ďseamlessí communications throughout the operational theater. We maximize use of photonic, microelectronic, signal processing, and composite material development technology. That technology allows fully distributed, dispersed, adaptive, and transparent voice and data communications supporting the Command vision objective to Ďown the spectrum.í"
Command and Control: "Efforts supporting battlefield synchronization, horizontal integration, fratricide avoidance, and real time situation awareness simulation and prototyping. The result allows us to demonstrate enhanced war fighting capabilities achievable by battlefield digitization."
Electronic Sensors: "Efforts supporting high performance target acquisition and engagement sensors."
Electronic Combat: "Efforts Supporting signal intelligence, communications jamming, and intelligence fusion materiel capabilities."
Other: "Efforts supporting a variety of communications systems that do not clearly fit into the previous categories, or [that] are integrated into other non-communications-electronics platforms."
The "Other" category also included six business areas acquired in FY 94 pursuant to a decision of the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) to discontinue the Fort Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center. The six mission areas were: Countermines, Physical Security, Electric Power, Low Cost/Low Observables, Battlefield Deception, and Environmental Controls. Even though transfer of these missions was not to occur formally until 1 October 1994, CECOM added eight of their programs to its AMC Managed Systems Quarterly Management Report for third quarter FY 94: the Multispectral Close Combat Decoy, Low-Cost/Low-Observable Technology, the Mine Hunter Killer, the Vehicular-Mounted Mine Detector, Off-Route Small Mine Clearance, the Close-In Man-Portable Mine Detector, Man-Portable Generator Sets, and Soldier Individual Power.
The systems managed by CECOM were not the kinds of things "the public" normally imagined when thinking of war. Unlike guns, tanks, planes, and missiles, CECOM commodities were not instruments of destruction, per se. And since they did not purposefully kill people or blow up bridges, they were not even commonly thought to be "weapon systems." What commonplace ignored, however, was that CECOM-developed technologies and CECOM-managed equipment existed in almost every major weapons platform in the Army, and that most of these platforms would be absolutely ineffectual in modern warfare without their CECOM products. Commonplace also usually ignored the fact that commanders could not act effectively on the battlefield without the information gathering, processing, and transport capabilities CECOM systems provided independently from any other kind of platform. The war for Kuwait (Desert Storm) amply demonstrated the combat power of these non-destructive "weapons." And, fortunately, Army decision makers took the lesson to heart. As General Guenther said in his farewell address to the CECOM work force:
From the top down, leaders have come to realize that timely and accurate information has become the single most important commodity of modern warfare. Neither the biggest bombs nor the deadliest missiles will turn the tide of the next battle. The side that controls information will be victorious. We are working hard to Ďwin the information war,í and CECOM is the command post.
The future promised to give CECOM even more clout. During his tour as Army Vice Chief of Staff, General John Tilelli initiated planning for a major revamping of the Army's Information Technology (IT) operations. The plan, known as the Signal Organization Mission alignment, called for CECOM to assume the functions of DISC4's Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency (ISSAA), the functions of Information Systems Command (ISC) Army Small Computer Program Office, and most of the functions of ISC's Information Systems Engineering Command. This would make CECOM responsible for all IT and signal-related sustainment, acquisition, engineering, and procurement operations. Robert Brewin, a reporter for Federal Computer Week, quoting "top-ranking DOD officials," said that combining CECOM, with its expertise in battlefield IT systems, and ISSAA, which specialized in more "plain vanilla" acquisitions, "could lead to the development of an acquisition powerhouse." The combining of ISSAA with CECOM to create "the Army's centralized computer superstore" would reinforce DISC4 plans to bring all the local directors of information management at posts, camps, and stations under its control and provide them with architecture and the technical guidance required for a centralized IT policy. The proposed realignment would also position the Army to move from its immediate focus on supporting the tactical-brigade-and-below level needs of Force XXI to the next version of an information systems architecture that would embrace, as well, the sustaining base, embedded systems, and joint operations. In January 1996, General Guenther, who was then DISC4, expected the Army's senior leadership to make a decision on the realignment plan in a month or two.
Structures and Resources
The command performed its functions and achieved its mission with a budget (in FY 95) of $1.6 billion and the combined efforts of about 10,300 military, civilian, and contractor personnel in the Research, Development and Engineering Center (RDEC), the Logistics and Readiness Center (LRC), the Acquisition Center, two garrisons, and various management and management support organizations.
Driven by diminished funding and the directed draw-down of the military and civilian work force, the RDEC restructured itself in FY 93 into a seven-directorate organization with one directorate for each of four major business areas (communications, command and control, electronic combat, and electronic sensors) and three directorates to perform functions shared by multiple business areas (software engineering, test and evaluation, and advanced concepts). The RDEC employed 2,400 civilians and soldiers.
The LRC had 2,500 civilian and military employees in eight directorates. Its mission included production engineering, product quality management, requirements development and materiel inventory management, manufacturing science and technology, security assistance management, technical data and literature, materiel fielding, and field technical assistance. It operated three National Inventory Control Points that supported more than 75,000 national stock numbers and managed CECOM support to the Foreign Military Sales program with a portfolio of about $1.7 billion. In 1996, the LRC began to implement a major restructuring that involved the disestablishment of the existing functionally-oriented organizations (Materiel Management, Systems Management, Logistics and Maintenance, Readiness, and Product Integrity and Production Engineering) and the establishment in their place of multi-functional "weapon systems" organizations for each of the Commandís various business areas.
The Acquisition Center, with nearly 600 employees, had four "buying" divisions, each of which was responsible for the procurement of goods and services, again generally related to a CECOM business area (technology and equipment type).
The support organizations, included the two garrisons (Fort Monmouth and Vint Hill Farms Stations) and such key operating elements as the Directorate of Corporate Information, the Resources Management Directorate, Personnel and Training, and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. These organizations had a combined work force of about 1,600 civilians and soldiers.
Restructuring that occurred in the command in 1994 and 1995 was largely a product of two external influences: decisions of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) and continuation of the retrenchment that began in the Army at the end of the Cold War. The influences of the latter in CECOM were reflected in "Reshape II."
During FY 93 and into FY 94, CECOM prepared detailed plans to implement three BRAC Ď93 decisions: realign activities at Fort Monmouth, disestablish the Belvoir RDEC, and close Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS). The BRAC Division (Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate) submitted final iterations of these three plans to AMC and Department of the Army on 29 October 1993. Legislation required the government to complete BRAC Ď93 actions by the end of FY 98. However, in response to entreaties of the Clinton administration, Department of Defense advanced the deadline to 30 September 1997.
In connection with the disestablishment of the Belvoir RDEC, BRAC Ď93 eliminated five business areas, moved five to the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), and realigned six "in place" to CECOM (Countermines, Low Cost Low Observables, Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, and Environmental Controls). By virtue of a memorandum of agreement between CECOM, TACOM, and the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM), CECOM took operational control of its six new business areas and their personnel on 1 February 1994. Department of Army formally completed the disestablishments and realignments on 30 September 1994, three years before the deadline.
The realignment of Fort Monmouth involved the relocation of the Chaplain Center and School from Main Post to Fort Jackson, South Carolina; the relocation of CECOM activities from the GSA-leased CECOM Office Building (COB) in Tinton Falls to Main Post; the closing and disposal of the Evans Area and the relocation of its occupants to Main Post and the Charles Wood Area; and the disposal of excess housing in Olmstead Gardens. These actions had no effect on manpower authorizations, but did entail migration of personnel, as displayed below. An unrelated action -- the relocation of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade to Fort Gordon (494 military and six civilian employees) -- vacated space on Main Post for CECOM administrative personnel in Tinton Falls.
Fort Monmouth BRAC: Migration of Personnel
Army Research Lab
The closing of Vint Hill Farms Station entailed the transfer to other locations of 762 civilian and 399 military positions and the elimination of 240 civilian positions. Organizations and personnel to be transferred to Fort Monmouth included the on-site components of CECOMís Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate, C3I Acquisition Center, and Legal Office; on-site components of the Program Executive Office for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, including the Program Manager for Signals Warfare; and all the Intelligence Material Management Center except the missions identified for transfer to Tobyhanna Army Depot (the wholesale supply, repair, and maintenance missions). The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) was to transfer its VHFS entities -- the Mission Support Activity and the Force Modernization Activity -- to Fort Belvoir. Fort Meade was to receive functions and personnel of the Operational Security Evaluation Group. Other activities, such as the Technical Contract Management Office, the TMDE Support Center, and VHFS contingents of the Health Services Command were to be reassigned to installations that, as of the date of the Implementation Plan (29 October 1993), were yet to be identified. The disposition of the VHFS work force is displayed below. Of the 240 positions slated for elimination, seven belonged to the Information Systems Command, ten to PEO IEW, eighty-six to CECOM, and the remainder, 137, to the VHFS Garrison. To meet the accelerated closing date (30 September 1997), CECOM entered into a memorandum of agreement with the Industrial Operations Command to effect the early transfer of IMMCís unique maintenance and repair mission to Tobyhanna and negotiated with the Corps of engineers to accelerate the start of new construction for the IMMC, IEWD, and PEO elements that were to move from Virginia to Fort Monmouth. The LRC took its first tentative step toward relocating the IMMC in late 1995 with the establishment of the "Signal Intelligence Division (Provisional).
Destiny of the VHFS Work Force
To Fort Monmouth
To Fort Meade
To Fort Belvoir
To other bases TBD
To be eliminated
The closing of VHFS and the Evans Area and the realignment at Fort Monmouth involved expenditures, pegged at nearly $70 million, for construction and renovation of facilities. This included construction of a new Chaplain Center at Fort Jackson (Project 42280, $8 million), renovation of buildings in the 1200 Area for CECOM administrative and readiness organizations (Project 42708, $22 million), and renovation of building 2700 (the Myer Center) for research and development organizations, including all the pieces of PEO IEW (Project 42683, $4 million). Projects 42708 and 42683 included "Information Management Area" (IMA) expenses of $6.5 million.
To accommodate IMMC activities at Fort Monmouth, the VHFS BRAC Implementation Plan called for the renovation of Building 1201 (Project 42681) to provide for a "restricted controlled" site with two Special Access Program areas, a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Facility, and class A vaults for SCI material. Renovations were to include elevator support and installation of an Intrusion Detection System. The plan also called for construction of a pre-engineered building for use in IMMC equipment fabrication programs. It estimated the total cost of construction for IMMC at $5.4 million.
For relocating the IEWD from VHFS and Evans to Main Post (Project 42682), the BRAC Implementation Plans stipulated construction of a building with SCI and Special Access Program areas, computer labs, common support areas, and functional areas for graphic arts and classified document destruction; a Guardrail V test bed using existing sixty-five foot high equipment towers; remote non-SCI laboratory facilities to include a high-bay shop; and a pre-engineered storage building. The estimated cost of construction, to include utilities, uninterruptible power supply, emergency generators, fire protection, an integrated access control system, site improvements, and perimeter fencing totaled $19.2 million.
Apart from the inconvenience some employees might experience in moving their place of work from one location to another within the established boundaries of the installation and apart from the congestion associated with the consolidation of the work force in a smaller geographic area, BRAC Ď93 had no immediately identifiable impact upon CECOM employees at Fort Monmouth. The displacements they might suffer with internal realignment were for them a small price to pay for release from an exile to a distant, alien island. CECOM civilian employees at Vint Hill Farms Station were not nearly as fortunate. To them, the prospect of being transplanted from the Elysian fields of "The Farm" to the urban milieu of the Jersey shore was, at least at first glance, every bit as distressing as the prospect of removal to Rock Island Arsenal had been to workers at Fort Monmouth. Even worse for many at Vint Hill Farms -- Garrison employees primarily, but also employees unwilling to relocate -- was the prospect of being left without a job of any kind.
CECOM hoped to reduce the number of involuntary separations through attrition, for which it planned to effect the usual VERA/VSIP incentives and intensive out-placement assistance. For the latter, as detailed in the BRAC Implementation Plan, it employed the services of the local Transition Assistance Office, the Department of Defense Civilian Assistance and Re-Employment and Priority Placement Programs, the Defense Outplacement Referral System, the Office of Personnel Management Displaced Employee Program, the Interagency Placement Assistance Program, and job fairs. There were also state programs, not identified in the Plan, that assisted displaced workers. Involuntary separations -- the "Reduction in Force" -- would occur in FY 97; the number of appropriated fund personnel separated involuntarily would depend, of course, on the success of the attrition efforts.
CECOMís BRAC managers expected many employees who were subject to transfer of function to accept reassignment to Fort Monmouth: an unusually large percentage of them responded favorably during a non-binding survey. However, many of them had little effective choice: at a time of retrenchment, there were few opportunities in other agencies at comparable grades for employees with the highly technical, specialized skills of the VHFS work force. Transfer of function was a bitter pill for them for which they required considerable assistance in the swallowing, to include, for example, assistance in exploring other employment options.
A "Transition Team" developed at Vint Hill Farms Station to assist affected employees, contractors, and family members in the adjustments associated with their "transition" to new jobs or new homes.The team, chaired by the Army Community Services Officer, had about forty members representing all the on-post organizations. During FY 94 it organized an installation-wide survey in coordination with the Civilian Personnel Office and the Virginia Employment Commission Rapid Response Office to identify the transition needs of soldiers, civilians and contractors (October). It co-sponsored a large job fair and staged a relocation fair with subject-matter experts from Fort Monmouth, Fort Gordon, and Tobyhanna Army Depot. Though smaller than the fairs of earlier years, the Fourth Annual Job Fair (July 1994) emphasized opportunities for displaced workers in such fields as telecommunications, computers, engineering, logistics, equipment operation, and law enforcement. The Transition Team also orchestrated efforts to obtain for the work force the benefits of the stateís Economic Dislocated Workers Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) retraining program. A special effort at cooperation between the state and Department of Defense made Vint Hill employees eligible for early registration in this program, and on 2 June 1994 the Director of the Governorís Committee on Employment and Training personally informed them of the programís skills assessment, training, and placement services. The Transition Center had 39,000 client contacts in FY 94, up 12,000 from FY 93. Programs it offered in addition to relocation briefings included career planning services and workshops on "Financial Planning for Transition," "Workplace Stress," "Change Management," and "Focus on the Future."
The Civilian Personnel Office at Vint Hill, a component of the Garrison, offered other kinds of assistance. On 23 November 1993, it conducted the first Defense Outplacement Referral System (DORS) registration for Vint Hillís civilian employees. Subsequently, it organized a comprehensive one-on-one counseling program to address concerns and questions regarding transfer of function; outplacement through the Priority Placement Program, the DORS, and the Interagency Placement Program; separation benefits; continuation of health insurance; and re-employment eligibility. It framed a BRAC Personnel Strategy Plan in which it set a schedule for communicating BRAC-related information to the work force. And in September in anticipation of a reduction-in-force, it surveyed eligible employees to ascertain the number that would be swayed by voluntary separation incentive pay to accept early retirement.
CECOM had already begun the move from Tinton Falls. Between June and October 1993, the Command Group, the Public Affairs Office, and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate moved out of the CECOM Office Building (COB) into Russel Hall. Though Russel Hall was but a way station pending relocation to a permanent home in Watters Hall (Building 1207), the Command Group deemed the move wise both as a sign of good faith and as a measure that could help the installation avert scrutiny in BRAC Ď95. Meanwhile, in the wake of the move to Russel Hall, BRAC Division personnel launched correspondence through AMC to effect a reduction in GSA rental charges for the space vacated in COB. Concurrently, realizing the impossibility of completing the Fort Monmouth realignment by September 1997 if the Chaplain Center remained on post until its scheduled moving date (January 1997), CECOM prevailed upon Department of the Army to advance the Chaplainsí removal by a full year (to January 1996), as proposed by TRADOC.
By March 1996, CECOM had begun the construction and renovation of all the facilities required to accommodate incoming employees. Ground-breaking for the largest of new facilities -- the $14 million, 90,000 square-foot complex to accommodate three hundred IEWD employees on Main Post, occurred in September 1995. The LRC initiated the first BRAC-related relocation of personnel from Vint Hill to Fort Monmouth in summer 1995 with establishment of the SIGINT Division (Provisional). By the end of the fiscal year, seven employees had relocated to this new Division from Vint Hillís Intelligence Materiel Management Center. Meanwhile, in August 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense approved the transfer of 246 excess housing units in the Charles Wood Area (Olmstead Gardens) to Department of the Navy.
The final decisions of BRAC Ď95 required the disestablishment of the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in St. Louis and the transfer of 178 of its personnel (including eight military) to Fort Monmouth. These were the people who were responsible for the acquisition and logistics support of aviation-related communications-electronics materiel. With the disestablishment of ATCOM, CECOM also acquired the Program Manger for Electric Power and the Weapon System Manager for Physical Security, both which remained in place, however, at Fort Belvoir.
DODís BRAC Ď95 Joint Cross-Service Working Group on Laboratories, recognizing Fort Monmouthís quality and the achievements of Fort Monmouth activities, recommended Fort Monmouth as the site for DODís Center for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence. This was the basis for the DOD recommendation to relocate Rome Laboratory, an Air Force organization, to Fort Monmouth and Hanscomb AFB. However, the BRACís final decision rejected this recommendation, notwithstanding a GAO report that recommended the relocation as being both a more efficient use of facilities and cheaper for the taxpayer. Department of Defense also recommended relocation of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) from Bayonne, New Jersey, to Fort Monmouth. The BRAC, however, gave the MTMC a choice of installations, including Fort Monmouth, onto which it might eventually relocate.
During FY 94, it became apparent that the anticipated Program Budget Guidance for FY 96 would not support the existing command structure. The CECOM Executive Advisory Committee (CEAC) had already determined that the basic command structure was correct for accomplishing the mission: therefore, the RESHAPE II Task Force focused strategies to avoid involuntary personnel separations while achieving affordability in directly funded accounts with major shortfalls and reimbursable accounts with eroded customer bases.
In August 1994, General Guenther informed the work force that funding reductions anticipated for FY 96 required a new round of "reshaping" initiatives. His announcement indicated the need to cut the work force by another 500 - 600 employees. To lessen the potentially adverse impact of this cut, CECOM again requested approval for Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP). Guenther made the announcement by video tape "to reduce rumors and provide employees with plenty of time to make their plans while continuing to accomplish their mission." To assess the interest of the work force in the VERA/VSIP incentives, the Personnel and Training Directorate distributed more than 1900 survey questionnaires to employees who were eligible for optional or early retirement. As of the end of FY 94, one of seven CECOM employees (fifteen percent of the work force) was eligible for optional retirement.
Guentherís message to the employees is quoted, verbatim, below:
Last month, I commissioned a reshape team. I tasked the team to begin examining command-wide functions that could be reduced or eliminated and how future resources will be allocated to each Command Executive Advisory Council principal. I also tasked the team to develop strategies to reduce the impact of anticipated reductions and to develop timelines to meet reshaping challenges.
The challenge that we face is an issue of affordability in fiscal year 1996 and beyond. We are projecting shortfalls in both our direct and customer funding that will require reductions in our work force beyond what we expect from attrition.
Based on what we currently know, we would have to reduce our on-board strength by approximately five hundred to six hundred employees by the beginning of fiscal year 1996 to maintain an affordable work force through the end of the fiscal year.
Please keep in mind, these numbers are based on information we have today. Changes in the methods of calculating strength figures at the DOD level, as well as other unknown events, could cause these numbers to change.
There are several key reshaping events that are now taking place. Having prioritized our missions and functions and having allocated our resources, we will then develop a "new reshaping organizational concept." The next step is to request approval from AMC headquarters for VERA and VSIP. We will also be determining our options for approving VSIP applications if weíre required to limit eligibility to only employees whose resignation or retirement would directly save an employee facing separation. The VERA/VSIP window would then open for a specific period of time; right now we project late this calendar year or early next year. Based on the results and other efforts to minimize the impact of the reductions, we would then be in a position to know if a RIF would be necessary.
During the short VERA/VSIP window, 19 December 1994 through 13 January 1995, CECOM received and accepted 587 applications -- a sufficient number to avoid involuntary separations. General Brohm communicated the good news to CECOM employees by letter dated 27 January 1995. Thereupon, the task at hand was to "cross level" the work force: to reassign or promote employees from abolished positions to valid vacancies. The Acting Director of Personnel and Training assured employees that there would be no reductions in grade or pay as a result of cross-leveling.
Reshape II achieved its objectives partly through efficiency initiatives. The LRC centralized the Computer Aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (CALS) Office in headquarters; the Readiness Directorate brought in outside work to increase the number of reimbursable positions from 118 to 132; Materiel Management employed mergers to eliminate two branches; the IMMC realigned seven directorates into five divisions; and LMD eliminated one commodity branch and one support division branch. The RDEC had already accomplished a major restructuring (during Reshape I) in which it reduced fourteen "boxes" to six on the organization chart. Reshape in other organizations generally involved elimination of missions and/or reduction or transfer of services. The result was a reduction of the work force to an "affordable" 6,560 spaces.
Also as outcomes of Reshape II, the first-line supervisor to employee ratio increased from 1:10 to nearly 1:12 as of the end of FY 95; the overall supervisor to employee ratio grew from 1:7 to 1:8.5; the clerical support ratio increased from 1:10.7 to almost 1:13; and the command came in under the AMC-specified FY 97 "cap" for high grades. The VERA/VSIP window opened as scheduled in December 1995 and January 1995, and CECOM once again averted an involuntary "Reduction in Force."
"Technology Generation and Application" at CECOM was primarily a responsibility of the commandís Research, Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC). Heir to the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, the RDEC had over the years accumulated an impressive list of "firsts" in technology that included, among other things, inventions that were of critical importance in launching the "information revolution" of the late Twentieth Century. The tradition of achievement continued in the 1990ís with emphasis on applying technologies of the information revolution to military objectives while developing new information technologies to meet unique military requirements. Following a visit to Fort Monmouth in May 1995, Dr. Paul Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, acknowledged the RDECís recent achievements in these terms:
The talent and motivation of your personnel is evident in the monumental progress they have made in bringing the Armyís C4 architecture into the 21st Century. Bob Giordano and his RDEC personnel have done a superb job in bridging the gaps between the technical, acquisition, and user communities.
The following paragraphs touch upon a few of the RDECís most important activities from January 1994 through March 1996.
Scope and Significance
CECOM managed half the Armyís Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD) in 1994 and 1995 and participated in a large percentage of the balance. Of the seven ATDs the Army completed in FY 95, CECOM managed five: Common Ground Station, Survivable Adaptive Systems, Radar Deception and Jamming, Multisensor Aided Targeting - Air, and Close-in Manportable Mine Detector. Achieved in collaboration with Program Executive Offices and users, these ATDs focused on speeding the insertion of emerging technologies into operational systems.
Altogether, CECOM owned nearly a quarter of all the Armyís approved Science and Technology Objectives (STO). It managed sixteen of the thirty-five Advanced Concepts and Technology II programs the Army awarded in FY 95. It also had the Armyís most active Independent Research and Development (IR&D) program and one of its largest Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) programs.
In administering its IR&D program, CECOM focused on outreach and publicity. In FY 95, the command hosted eight Technology Interchange Meetings, representing forty-one IR&D projects valued at $21.9 million, and consecrated to the program one Level II Advance Planning Briefing for Industry. IR&D successes that year included the Embedded GPS/Inertial System, which involved the integration of a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver module with a ring laser gyro inertial navigation system in a single chassis, and the SPANet Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Switch. The latter, installed in five Army, Navy, and Air Force Locations, were connected via satellite and terrestrial links to form a test network known as the Joint Advanced Demonstration Environment.
CECOM placed $10.3 million of "seed money" on seventy-three SBIR contracts in FY 95. SBIR products delivered that year included the Soldierís Personal Adaptive Monitor -- a miniature, low-power, helmet-mounted display for the dismounted soldier featuring a full 640x480 monocle that could be adapted to either eye and a VGA-quality resolution that permitted uncompromised display of computer graphics -- and a Collaborative Scenario Generator for an Integrated Decision Aids Demonstration System. The latter enhanced methods of generating command and control scenarios to support tactical mission planning for law enforcement agencies and the military. A high-priority of the Battle Command Battle Laboratory for use at the Command and General Staff College, it was co-funded by the Office of National Drug Control Policy to support planning and operations in areas of high-density drug traffic.
Lists of the eighteen ATDs and the thirty-four additional STOs that CECOM owned in 1995 illustrate the scope of the commandís R&D mission. In the first list, ATDs are grouped according to the objectives of the Armyís strategic plan. The remaining STOs occur in the second list in the order in which they are listed in the Army Science and Technology Master Plan.
CECOM ATDs (1995)
Protect the Force
Advanced Image Intensification
Close-in Man Portable Mine Detector
Off Route Smart Mine Clearance
Bi-Static Radar for Weapons Location
Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector
Hunter Sensor Suite
Execute Precision Strike
Multisensor Aided Targeting - Air
Radar Deception and Jamming
Common Ground Station
Air/Land Enhanced Reconnaissance and Targeting
Win the Information War
Digital Battlefield Communications
Combined Arms Command and Control
Survivable Adaptive Systems
Battlespace Command and Control
Project and Sustain Combat
CECOM STOs (1995)
Advanced Helicopter Pilotage
Joint Speakeasy - Multiband Multimode Radio
Improved Spectrum Efficiency Modeling and Simulation
Aviation Integration into the Digitized Battlefield
Communications Countermeasure Demonstration
Intelligence Fusion Demonstration (Completed in FY 95)
Orion (wide bandwidth SIGINT electronic support package on a short-range UAV)
Tactical Intelligence Data Fusion
Multimission UAV Payload
Digital Communications Electronic Attack
Rapid Force Projection Initiative
Aerial Scout Sensors Integration
Electronic Integrated Sensor Suite for Air Defense
Low Cost, Low Observable Multispectral Technology
Tactical Electric Power Generation
Integrated Photonic Subsystem
Information Warfare On-the-Move
Networking and Protocols
Advanced Optics and Display Applications
Modular High Density, High Performance Processor Technology
Soldier Individual Power Source
Electronic Warfare Processing Techniques (completed in FY 95)
Non-Communications Electronics Support Measures/Electronic Countermeasures Techniques
Diverse Wavelength Sources (completed in FY 95)
Advanced Electro-Optic and Infrared Countermeasures
Advanced Radio Frequency Countermeasures
Smart Focal Plane Arrays
Advanced Focal Plane Arrays
Multi-Wavelength Multi-Function Laser
Advanced Aided Target Recognition Processing and Algorithm Exploitation (completed in FY 95)
Electronic Terrain Board
The scope of the commandís R&D mission is further reflected in the number and variety of specialized, world-class research facilities the RDEC operated in 1994 and 1995, as displayed in the following partial list:
CECOM R&D Facilities
Command and Control Laboratory
C2 Concepts Laboratory
C2 Prototyping Laboratory
Interactive Speech Technology Laboratory
System Testbed for Avionics Research
Advanced C2 Decision Support Aids and Interoperability Laboratory
Communications Systems Design Center
High Speed Communications Test Facility
MSE Support Facility
Modeling and Simulation Facility
Development Engineering Facility
Digital Integrated Laboratory
Software Prototyping and Integration Laboratory
Command, Control, and Communications Integration Laboratory
Tactical Data Fusion Laboratory
Simulation and Modeling Laboratory
Advanced Sensor Evaluation Facility
Electronic Warfare Survivability Integration Laboratory
Local Area Communications Integration Laboratory
Commercial Communications Technology Laboratory
Joint Advanced Demonstration Environment Testbed
Army Battle Command System Interoperability Laboratory
Antenna Evaluation Facility
IEW Technology Assessment Center
Secure, Instrumented 5000-Meter Laser Test Range
Sensor Evaluation Test Range
Physical Security Equipment Laboratory
Infrared Focal Plane Array Microfactory
Radar Target Measurement System (mobile)
Interactive Speech Technology Laboratory
Avionics Validation and Test Facility
Environmental Test Facility
CECOM established the Commercial Communications Technology Laboratory to assess the military utility of commercial innovations and to ensure the timely, successful, and cost-effective insertion of commercial technology in military systems. Industry used the Laboratory to demonstrate to the Army various products and technologies, including (in 1995) Digital Trunked Land Mobile Radio, Direct Broadcast Satellite, ATM software for video teleconferencing and collaborative planning, Broadband Code Division Multiple Access, handheld FM radios, and ATM switches and multiplexers.
For early proof and testing of its airborne innovations, Team Fort Monmouth relied in large measure on the System Test Bed for Avionics Research (STAR, a uniquely configured UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter) and other facilities of the C2SIDís Airborne Engineering Evaluation Support Branch. This organization participated significantly in developing prototypes of the Multi-Sensor Aided Targeting - Air system, the Aided Pilotage System, the Personnel Locator System, the Soldier 911 system, the Doppler Embedded GPS Navigation System, the Radar Deception and Jamming ATD, and the Team Antenna.
In FY 95, CECOM completed construction of a 20,000 square feet facility for its Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate to serve as a Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) Operations Center and focal point for analysis and evaluation of DSCS network control. Also in FY 95, CECOM completed a $1 million renovation of nearly 10,000 square feet of space in the Myer Center to accommodate Computer Engineering Laboratory Five and began construction on Main Post for new laboratory facilities to accommodate elements of the IEW Directorate that were to relocate to Fort Monmouth from Vint Hill Farms Station, Virginia, and the Evans Area.
From January 1994 into FY 96 and beyond, research and development in CECOM focused on the creation of Force XXI, the Armyís vision of itself in the Twenty-First Century. The commandís strategy in this effort involved partnerships with TRADOC, Program Executive Offices, and industry; deployment of scientists and engineers to field new technical capabilities; emphasis on the application of technology (rather than its generation) to expedite the fielding of useful products; and establishment of "beta" sites with users to evaluate technologies and produce immediate improvements. On the road to Force XXI CECOM had or would have the assistance of two intermediaries: the "Battle Labs," with which the command field tested its concepts, and "Task Force XXI." Task Force XXI was a project to turn the 4th Infantry Division (formerly the 2d Armored Division) into a prototype of the Force XXI Army. As "Experimental Force" (EXFOR) for Force XXI, the 4th Infantry Division would test CECOMís architecture for the digital battlefield in brigade and division-level exercises that were to begin in 1997.
In the meantime, CECOM was making Task Force XXI possible by solving difficult technical problems on the spot (in "real time" in military parlance) and by supplying troops of the Battle Labs with technologically advanced systems -- equipment and software -- to supplement systems already in the field. These efforts would ultimately give the Army a basis for deciding what the force of the Twenty-First Century would look like, both technically and doctrinally. At the core of Force XXI and the experiments leading to it was what had come to be known in the Army as "digitization." Digitization -- the Digital Battlefield concept -- was (in the simplest terms) the use of computers and digital transmission technologies to link all an armyís soldiers and equipment, giving commanders the ability to assess the disposition of friendly and enemy forces quickly with a glance at a flat-panel display, whether in headquarters or a forward command post. For CECOM, digitization -- the military application of the "information revolution" -- meant supplying the tools that would give soldiers the right information in the right place at the right time. Army Acquisition Executive Gilbert F. Decker spoke of digitization objectives in these terms:
The ability to dominate the battlefield or to conduct operations other than war efficiently will depend completely on having the pertinent information in the right hands at the right time. In military terms, this is often summarized as situation awareness. It seems clear to warfighters and technologists alike that if commanders and decision makers at every echelon of the Army are completely aware of their total situation at all times, they will react with a course of action that will place them inside the opposing forcesí decision cycle. Thus, with numerically inferior forces, one can achieve combat leverage dominance.
The Armyís ambitious strategy to equip its forces with digital technology, in the words of one reporter, "catapulted electronics to the forefront of its plans and thrust CECOM into the limelight." Though Department of the Army established an "Army Digitization Office" in the Pentagon to supply some Army-wide oversight in the implementation, it was clear from the outset that the nuts and bolts of the effort -- responsibility for actualizing the concept -- lay squarely upon CECOM and its RDEC; this, in turn, gave the command an increasingly prominent role in service debates on acquisition, training, and doctrine.
It also gave the command a rare opportunity. The products of CECOM "touched" every Army system. While the diversity of these products -- and the complexity of the CECOM mission -- was noteworthy, it was their integration and the resulting synergy that would have the greatest impact on the art of war in the early centuries of the third millennium. In conjunction with its partners in Team Fort Monmouth, the RDEC supplied products that transcended individual organizations, putting CECOM in position to accomplish what no other organization in DOD could accomplish -- that is, to integrate the Army. To this end, CECOMís RDEC wrote the Armyís Technical Architecture -- a set of "building code" standards to be employed in all new C4IEW systems -- and accepted responsibility for functioning as the Armyís System Engineer to enforce this architecture. Department of the Army (DISC4) required an architecture that was comprehensive; an architecture applicable to all weapon, soldier, and information systems; and an architecture that supported joint and combined operations. Recognizing CECOMís leadership role in achieving and maintaining this architecture, General Salomon named General Brohm AMCís lead for the EXFOR Coordination Cell that he established at Fort Hood to support the 4th Infantry Division with the fielding of all types of equipment and prototypes.
Army officials described the path to Force XXI during the AUSA conference at Fort Monmouth in May 1995. To achieve the goal, they said, the Army had to improve the inter-networking of current legacy systems while concurrently developing a future, fully digital Battlefield Information Transfer System (BITS). It already had contracts in place to equip the EXFOR with computers (the $1.5 billion Common Hardware/Software II contract with a GTE/Sun Microsystems team and the $240 million Appliquť contract with TRW). The "Appliquť," known formally as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System, consisted of a computer, software, a GPS receiver, and a communications interface. It would supply a digital link for weapon systems that had none (meaning most of the existing systems) and give troops digital maps with nearly real-time updates displaying the location of friendly and enemy forces and raising situational awareness, thereby, to "unprecedented levels." General Campbell, PEO for Command and Control Systems, thought that computer capacity would not be a problem, but that there might be a problem with the communication pipes that would be needed to network the computers. Moreover, Appliquť-equipped systems would not have the ability to link with state of the art systems such as the M1A2 Abrams Tank and the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter, both of which had been built as digital systems from the ground up. General Gust, PEO Communications Systems, spoke of the Armyís strategy to address these problems. The Army had a program under way to seamlessly interconnect the "legacy" systems that it had acquired in recent decades at a cost of nearly $10 billion: the long-haul TRI-TAC tropospheric scatter system, MSE, SINCGARS, and EPLRS. The SINCGARS radios, originally developed to handle voice rather than data, were to be upgraded to provide a throughput of 4,800 bits a second and would also come equipped with an internet controller card developed by ITT that would allow them to pass data to an EPLRS interface and to one another using standard Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). EPLRS and SINCGARS would, in turn, pass data through a Tactical Multinet Gateway (TMG), a rugged version of a commercial router designed by GTE that would interface with TRI-TAC and MSE. Major General Joe Rigby, head of the Army Digitization Office, said that the Army planned to buy 750 Internet Controller Cards and seventeen TMGs for the experimental brigade. General Guenther, DISC4, said that the fix provided by these two hardware enhancements would "vertically and horizontally integrate our legacy systems" -- a remarkable accomplishment since these systems were not originally designed to dovetail in such a way to handle data. Because bandwidth requirements, especially for video teleconferencing and multimedia, would quickly exceed SINCGARSís capacity, CECOM was planning to release a solicitation for a Near-Term Digital Radio that would provide a throughput of at least 144 kilobits per second. CECOM expected bids from Hazeltine (which already had a 180 kbps digital radio), Hughes, and ITT. For long-haul communications between the United States and forward-deployed forces, said Gust, "We have to start thinking T-1 circuits." CECOM intended to provide these circuits initially through Lockheed Martinís MILSTAR satellite system with battlefield connectivity provided by mobile, HMMWV-mounted terminals developed by Raytheon and Rockwell as prototypes for the MILSTAR Advanced Terminal. Beyond that, according to Rigby, the Army wanted to rely more on commercial technologies to satisfy its high-bandwidth needs: this would include deployable cellular systems, personal communications systems, wideband data radios, and commercial satellites.
For the RDEC, navigating the path to Force XXI involved the following objectives: (1) Capitalize on the "explosion" in information technology to harness the potential of automation and digital communications for use in near-term applications and in the ultimate digitized Army; (2) build a flexible architecture and infrastructure for all Army systems; (3) continue developing new technologies for C4IEWS, combat identification, targeting systems, and software-intensive systems; (4) be the "technical bridge" between Battle Labs, basic research, early technology, PEO/PM programs, and industry; (5) integrate military and commercial technology; (6) expedite the insertion of technology into existing products; (7) work with the user to integrate technology with doctrine; and (8) profit from technology to increase the lethality of US weapon systems, protect the force, and exploit the vulnerabilities of opposing forces.
In working toward these objectives, the RDEC found two tools especially valuable in 1994 and 1995: the Digital Integrated Laboratory and the Advanced and Battle Lab Warfighting Experiments.
The Digital Integrated Laboratory
In 1994, building upon its earlier successes in use of the Army Interoperability Network to test and perfect techniques for interconnecting Army and Joint Service Systems, CECOM established the Digital Integrated Laboratory (DIL) specifically to support development of the Force XXI architecture.
Army policy mandated use of the DIL to develop, maintain, improve, and certify interoperability between and among the C4IEW hardware and software systems that were to be employed in Task Force XXI and follow-on division and corps-level warfighting experiments. The linkages that existed between DIL, the Battle Laboratories, contractors, and others and the ability to reconfigure the DIL readily to replicate any existing or evolving C4IEW environment allowed CECOM to perform rapid prototyping in each case at the outset of the certification process. For each system it certified, the DIL undertook in all its activities, including modeling and simulation, to eliminate as many potential problems as possible before committing the system to an exercise. One reporter likened the process to a "grueling virtual boot camp" -- a "a crucible in which the Army burned off applications that fell short of interoperability and ease of use requirements." Moreover, in providing an electronic link between the user, the contractor, and the materiel developer, the DIL gave the real user -- not the schools, but soldiers in the field -- the ability to provide input in real time to both the material developer and the contractor. The goal, said RDEC Director Robert Giordano at a 1995 Advance Planning Briefing for Industry, was to link developers and soldiers by "bringing the lab into the field and the soldier into the lab." In subjecting systems to an electronic gauntlet that simulated combat, the DIL allowed soldiers to get a feel for a prototype system, spot its weaknesses, and suggest changes well before the Army committed the system to the battle experiments of the EXFOR. "This," said General Brohm, "produces tremendous leverage in terms of moving quickly and efficiently into the future without the fits and starts of the past." With the DIL, Brohm noted, the Army moved beyond arguing about what direction it would take and, instead, provided sufficient discipline to the development process to allow leaders to make confident decisions, incrementally, about what should be added to the capability packages of its hardware and software. "Discussions now focus on how objectives will be achieved," he said, "not on what the objectives are."
One of the DILís heaviest near-term users was TRW, Inc., contractor for the Force XXI Appliquť. TRW subjected software for the Appliquť to extensive integration and interoperability testing in the DIL, with a "user jury" at Fort Knox evaluating incremental software releases and working directly with TRW and its subcontractors to make improvements.
CECOM officials demonstrated some of the other DIL-tested capabilities in March and May 1995 during live demonstrations in Washington and Fort Monmouth. These included:
∑Dismounted Soldier System: A pencil-sized camera mounted on the helmet of a soldier walking down a street in Haiti picked up digital video "footage." The images were downloaded through the soldierís radio to an antenna unit of a nearby HMMWV, then relayed to a field Tactical Operations Center and on through a Secure Telephone Unit III connection to command headquarters. At headquarters, commanders were able to freeze, play back, or zoom in on the images and transmit instructions back to the soldier while the camera was still rolling.
∑Electronic Mail: An e-mail message from a soldier in Georgia, generated on a ruggedized laptop, was relayed through half a dozen digital platforms, including an ATM switch, using a wireless internet Protocol. Before the message flashed on a screen in Fort Monmouth, it passed through several networked PCs, a HMMWV-mounted work station, a SINCGARS radio, and a surrogate satellite communications terminal on the roof of the Myer Center.
∑Prototype Aviation Mission Planning System: This system linked digital elevation data with digitized, two dimensional colored maps to create realistic three-dimensional "landscapes" through which a pilot, flying a work station, could rehearse a bombing run. Using a mouse, the pilot designated a target on the map, displayed on one screen, then "flew over it" in the simulated landscape produced on another screen.
∑Common Ground Station: In this test, fusing intelligence data and imagery from multiple sources, Synthetic Aperture Radar images of enemy troops moving under cloud cover were overlaid on digital terrain maps and fused with precise position data collected from the surveillance aircraft. This supplied the information needed to send in an unmanned aerial vehicle for a closer look with a digital camera, whose live images aided commanders in planning an ambush.
∑Digital Radio Communications: The DIL tested the reliability of digital radio links between tanks on the move by placing the vehicles in a simulated mountain environment. When a tank moved behind a simulated "ridge" (for example), it automatically lost its line of sight connection.
The DIL also provided a forum in which companies could show the Army their wares. And, according to Larry Denis, operations manager of ITTís Defense and Electronics Office in Tinton Falls, it provided industry with a venue in which to test new or evolving commercial systems within the Armyís technical architecture or conduct early evaluations of military systems under development. According to Colonel Robert Shively, chief of Special Projects Office for digitization, most of the testing conducted by the DIL involved real equipment, rather than modeling and simulation. However, the DIL employed modeling to analyze information obtained from exercises -- such as, for example, data on the volume, type, and destinations of traffic and the timeliness of transmissions -- to create a picture of Force XXI requirements. A subset of the DIL, the Software Prototyping and Integration Laboratory (SPIL), opened in October 1994 with a core staff of eight experts and several AMC software interns to provide the acquisition and development communities a quick-reaction, low-cost software development capability.
The Battle Labs and Warfighting Experiments
Department of the Army established the Battle Labs in coordination with the Training and Doctrine Command to test and refine technology and doctrine for the digital battlefield. In line with its commitment to its ultimate customer, the soldier, CECOMís RDEC was the first in AMC to establish and maintain a permanent field presence at all the Battle Labs. CECOM consecrated twenty-one positions to this role: eleven for permanently assigned personnel and ten for personnel on rotations ranging from 90 to 120 days. In FY 94, the command developed and implemented Memoranda of Agreement with the Battle Lab directors to legitimize its presence and specify its support to the Battle Lab missions.
CECOM field tested its new technologies in warfighting experiments, most but not all of which were staged by the Battle Labs. In FY 95, CECOM supplied concepts and hardware for testing and evaluation in Prairie Warrior (Combined Arms Center), Warrior Focus (Infantry School), Focused Dispatch (Armor Center), Unified Endeavor, and Joint Warfighter Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 95. In more than one of these exercises, CECOM and its PEO partners had more than fifty people in the field, living with the "troops" and participating in the evaluation of equipment and doctrine. For Force XXI and Synthetic Theater of War initiatives, CECOM produced an interface between the Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation and various equipment simulators. This permitted simulation of virtual combat elements in order to improve training and support evaluation of proposed battlefield systems and organizations while, at the same time, conserving resources. In Focused Dispatch, CECOM supplied a systems architecture design and engineering support that allowed soldiers to test their warfighting capabilities simultaneously against live and "virtual" forces with fully realistic, terrain-dependent tank-to-tank, tank-to-simulator, and simulator-to-simulator communications.
Some CECOM-supplied technology or another played a role in every such experiment, but especially in Warrior Focus, JWID 95, and Unified Endeavor, where CECOM applied the advanced communications technologies that it developed in the Adaptive Systems and Digital Battlefield Communications Advanced Technology Demonstrations. The "mother" of all warfighting experiments, the brigade and division-level exercises of Task Force XXI, would further evaluate technologies tested on a smaller scale and refined in the earlier Battle Lab exercises. Other CECOM contributions to Task Force XXI included:
∑The Hunter Sensor Surrogate (HS2). A lightweight, deployable and survivable vehicle platform with an advanced low-observable, long-range targeting capability, the HS2 combined second generation thermal imaging, day-time television, eye-safe laser rangefinders, embedded aided target recognition, and image compression and transfer technology.
∑Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS). CECOM acquired three DBS terminals for Task Force XXI to support rapid dissemination of data on the battlefield. JWID Ď95 sponsored demonstrations of the Global Broadcast Service/DBS for each of seven receiver sites -- Fort Gordon, Fort Huachuca, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Hood, Fort Lee, Fort Monmouth, and the Naval Research Laboratory -- using Common Ground Station Data. The demonstration showed users the technologyís battlefield capabilities.
∑Personal Communications System (PCS). Adaptation of commercial cellular telephone technology for dismounted infantry use, connecting through MSE.
∑Surrogate Digital Radio (SDR). Use of commercial technology to provide a wide-band "Data Hauler" for seamless transmission of information to forward-deployed units.
∑Message Standard. The RDEC aggressively pursued the development of the MIL-STD-188-220 Information Standard for military networks, for which it received joint service approval in record time (six months). The variable message format of this standard had the flexibility to meet the operational situations of the moment while restricting content to the required information only.
Advanced Technology Demonstrations and Other Technical Achievements
The US military would have a large array of sensors on the battlefield of the Twenty-First Century. Deployed aboard manned and unmanned platforms, as well as in orbiting satellites, these sensors would provide commanders with imagery, signals intelligence, telemetry, and other information crucial to maneuver, the performance of weapon systems, and protection of the force. But to exploit the capabilities of its sensors fully -- to make sense of the abundance of information they provided -- the US military depended on high-speed microprocessors, advanced electronic packaging, and new algorithms that allowed commanders to correlate information from various sources, sift it, and view it in immediately useful form. This manipulation of sensor information was knows as "sensor fusion."
One Army program that exploited sensor fusion (and correlation) was the Hunter Sensor Suite. It was the "hunter" part of the larger Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), which focused on moving targeting data quickly between "hunters" and "killers" to protect light forces from armored attack. Hunter would seek targeting data from a variety of sensors. It would have advanced Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors, two television cameras, a laser rangefinder, and a seeking module mounted on a stabilized platform aboard a HMMWV. The operator or operators in the vehicle would have access to as many as three displays: one for acoustics information, a second for TV and FLIR information, and a third for a remote sentry. The suite was intended to serve initially as a decision aid for the driver. Ultimately, the data gleaned would help the operator select targets and send information over Combat Net Radio (CNR) to a tactical operations center. The initiative would also look into linking sensors directly to weapons (the "killers"). Technology for the program included infrared focal plane arrays, high density integrated processors, and standard advanced detector assembly packaging. Particularly challenging was the use of acoustic sensors to identify ground targets. Historically, most work on acoustic sensors focused on identifying and classifying air-based targets: Identification of ground-based targets required engineers to filter out noise from wind, engines, wheels, and other environmental sources. Image compression was also a challenge for which the Army worked with industry to examine existing and emerging algorithms, such as wavelets. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the program, however, was the joining of different technologies that had previously been demonstrated only alone or in different applications. The need for an interoperable reconnaissance architecture pressed home during the War for Kuwait, when US forces deployed an assortment of sensors and other systems that could not communicate, contributing to the Militaryís inability to get intelligence quickly to those who needed it most. CECOM prepared a prototype of the system, the Hunter Sensor Surrogate, for Task Force XXI.
The Common Ground Station (CGS) ATD demonstrated transmittal of responsive, timely, correlated multi-sensor intelligence data to brigade commanders "on the move." Significant achievements of the demonstration included integration of the Army combat information process with the DOD Operational Support Office Global Broadcast System; proof of the ability to distribute multi-media data base information to low-cost, widely distributed remote sites; and proof of the benefits of using facilities in a sanctuary site for providing nearly real-time intelligence data to remote locations. Technological break-throughs included an expanded, automated, and integrated capability for receiving, processing, correlating, displaying, and disseminating intelligence and targeting data using Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlation, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle video, the Synthetic Aperture Radar Target Recognition and Location System, Second Generation Forward-Looking Infrared, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and Firefinder products. The ATD integrated the CGS processing capability with an advanced multibeam, multiband phased array antenna system that provided simultaneous reception of information from multiple sources. The CGS also featured advanced work stations and software and an advanced, multimedia distributed data base for filtering, storing, and processing information. Transferred or transferable products of the ATD included the antenna (to the Digital Battlefield Communications ATD for satellite communications on-the-move), Software (supplied to the JSTARS Project Manager for the Ground Station Module program and to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for the Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)), and information correlation algorithms (to the Intelligence community for use in Task Force XXI). CECOM demonstrated CGS capabilities in JWID 95.
In the Advanced ATR Processing and Algorithm Exploitation program, CECOM integrated signal processing prototypes of various kinds to achieve nearly real-time gauging of target acquisition data from multiple sensors (e.g. second generation thermal sensor, millimeter wave radar, laser radar, etc.). The aim was the development of technologies that would enhance both the lethality and survivability of future weapon systems. CECOM tested the prototype hardware using the Multi-Sensor Aided Targeting - Air algorithm and passed the proven technology on to the Electronic Integrated Sensor Suite program, the Hunter Sensor Suite ATD, and the Navy Rolling Airframe Missile program.
The Multi-Sensor Aided Targeting - Air (MSAT-Air) ATD demonstrated the economical fusion of second generation forward-looking infrared and millimeter wave radar in an airborne, automated target acquisition suite (Apache Longbow). CECOM conducted the demonstration under simulated battlefield conditions in a fully-operational flying test bed emulation of the RAH-66 target acquisition system. It included feature-level fusion algorithms, real-time processing, and man-in-the-loop evaluation, and it proved the technologyís ability both to increase the lethality of Army weapon systems and shorten target search times (thereby increasing aircrew survivability). Essentially, the integration of infrared and radar technologies gave pilots visual displays of targets and terrain not otherwise seen. The programís software algorithms transitioned to the Target Acquisition and the Air/Land Enhanced Reconnaissance and Targeting ATDs, where they were to be upgraded for use in on-the-move operations. The Rotorcraft Pilotís Associate ATD incorporated some of the MSAT-Airís system design concepts, and CECOM surrendered the prototype system (aircraft, processor, FLIR, and radar) for use in the Commanche program.
In FY 94, the RDEC developed a state-of-the-art ultra wideband receiver/downconverter for communications intercept that delivered five times the performance with one-hundredth the size and one thirtieth the weight of previously available technology. It was a single VXI-based circuit card covering the 10 MHz to 40 GHz range. The RDEC also developed a single VXI-based circuit card that provided 4 GHz of instantaneous bandwidth at a rate of sixteen gigasamples a second with a 10 KHz repetition rate. These products were to be used in the IEW family of common sensors, included the Ground Based Common Sensor, Advanced Quickfix, and Guardrail.
In March 1995, the RDEC fielded a Guardrail/Common Sensor system together with a Ground Tethered Satellite Relay and all the required support equipment. Valued at $758 million, this was the RDECís largest fielding ever to a single battalion. The system detected enemy radar and radio signals, traced the signals to their sources, and relayed the information to tactical commanders on the battlefield almost instantaneously.
Two of the five ATDs CECOM completed in FY 95 focused on techniques for protecting the force: the Close-in Manportable Mine Detector ATD and the Radar Deception and Jamming ATD.
The Close-in Manportable Mine Detector (CIMMD) ATD demonstrated the reliability of various technologies and combinations thereof in detecting both metallic and non-metallic anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. The demonstration evaluated various brassboard technologies against major mine types under varying environmental and operational conditions. It included evaluation of infrared and ground penetrating radar technologies both independently and in combination, and it proved the ability of existing technologies to detect more than eighty percent of the non-metallic anti-tank mines and more than half the non-metallic anti-personnel mines. Brassboard technologies developed for the program included separated aperture balanced bridge microwave sensors, thermal imaging, and synthetic pulse ground-penetrating radar. This ATD led to evaluation of selected prototype hardware components for immediate acquisition, use of the infrared camera in conjunction with the AN/PSS-12 mine detector in a Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab Warfighting Experiment (Warrior Focus), and transfer of technologies to the Hand-Held Standoff Mine Detection Sensor Program.
The Radar Deception and Jamming (RD&J) ATD employed a sensor suite to provide a knowledge-based management system for effective use of an aircraftís on-board countermeasures. Successfully tested in flight at the Electronic Combat Range, Eglin Air Force Base, the RD&J demonstrated integration of aircraft survivability equipment, situational awareness, non-cooperative target recognition, precision direction finding and location, target cueing of weapon systems, countermeasures control, and resource management. Key subsystem products of the program included the Sensor Fusion Processor, Advanced Threat Radar Jammer hardware, the User Data Module, a Digital Terrain Map System, an Aircraft Avionics Integrated Navigation System, a Data Collection and System Control Display, and simulations of a C3I data link, weapons systems, and an expendable dispenser. Integration of multi-sensor data fusion, automated tactical situation assessment, and response management with next-generation defensive systems and existing aircraft avionics produced a flyable, integrated Electronic Warfare system with a significantly increased probability of survival. All the ATDís software transitioned to the Advanced Threat Radar Jammer program. In addition, the ATD established a baseline for future integration of the Advanced Threat Countermeasure System and the AN/AVR-2A Laser Warning Receiver.
In FY 94, also to protect the force, the RDEC, using signature management technology, developed a survivable high-mobility camouflage skirt that was an effective signature suppressor and was capable of withstanding at least fifty miles of off-road maneuvering. During that time the Center also built and delivered the worldís very first scanned electron beam x-ray source for use in the Photon Backscatter Imaging Mine Detector.
The Combined Arms Command and Control ATD was a "capstone" information technology program addressing a broad range of Army C3I digitization issues. It worked at developing both the Force XXI and the Task Force XXI systems architectures, which specified the networking and distributed data base technologies required to support battlefield synchronization, horizontal and vertical integration, and situational awareness.
The Survivable Adaptive Systems (SAS) ATD demonstrated the ability of high-capacity communications network technologies to support the multimedia (voice, data, imagery) information requirements of the future battlefield, including on-the-move communications. The technologies demonstrated involved wireless local area networks (LAN) of both narrow and wide bandwidths, a tactical fiber-optic LAN, network management, gateways, and security. Break-throughs of the program included use of commercial standards and protocols in automated tools for configuring and managing complex tactical internetworks; use of a tactical multinet gateway to link older, "legacy" communication networks using commercial protocols and products; use of wideband packet data networks in several frequency bands for high-capacity data communication on the move; and use of a secure packet radio and software to disseminate intelligence data during on-the-move operations. SAS products applied to other programs included the Tactical Multinet Gateway and the Automated Network Management capability, transferred to Task Force XXI and the Joint Tactical Communications Systems Project Manager (PM JTACS); the Surrogate Digital Radio, to Task Force XXI; the AN/VRC-99 wideband packet radio and the wireless network capability, to the Signals Warfare Project Manager; and a dual-use wireless LAN, to the Program Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communications Systems.
In April 1995 during Proteus 95/Unified Endeavor, the 2d Armored Division deployed for a simulated warfighting exercise using RDEC-supplied Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) technology, integrated into the Divisionís Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) network, to provide the commander with a unique video teleconferencing and multi-media capability. The Proteus wide area network provided seamless communications from deployed brigades to division rear, corps, and into the National Capital Region. For the first time in an Army exercise, the division commander, using desktop video teleconferencing, could play an integral role in collaborative planning with his forward division elements. During his August 1995 visit to Fort Monmouth, Army Chief of Staff General Reimer learned first-hand of the benefits of the system when CECOM engineers linked him via the ATM/MSE system directly to Fort Hood and the Commander of the 2d Armored Division.
CECOM also deployed Trojan SPIRIT II to the National Training Center for Proteus 95, where the system employed ATM to transmit "hypermedia" from fixed strategic sites to maneuver brigades. Subsequently, at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, CECOM integrated Trojan with the Theater Missile Defense Tactical Operations Center for a demonstration at the Army Commandersí Conference. Grouped in a Defense Intelligence Support Element configuration, a Trojan SPIRIT II system at the Army War College received intelligence data, imagery, and motion video from the Analysis Control Element at Fort Hood. Lieutenant General Menoher, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, was reportedly "exuberant in his praise for both the concept and the execution." During FY 95, in the very year of the systemís acquisition, CECOM carried out twenty-three DA-directed fieldings of the Trojan SPIRIT II to Forces Command, USARPAC, USAREUR, and the US Army in Korea.
One of the technology break-throughs of FY 95 was the development of a database-to-database interface that eliminated the need for text-based message formats. Using a "clearing house" data base that contained a superset of all applicable data types, the interface coordinated data elements between different systems in a local or wide area network, thereby producing the standardization inherent in message formats. This reduced processing overhead and bandwidth while focusing on pertinent, time-critical information to provide commanders and analysts the data they needed, when they needed it, in a usable format.
CECOM researchers were responsible for developing the individual soldierís computer and radio that were to be the heart of the initial Land Warrior System. The Army expected to field about 5,000 of these first generation systems by 1999, probably beginning with the 82d Airborne Division. The second generation system might incorporate the CECOM-developed, helmet-mounted "pencil" camera, in addition to a wide view-field image intensifier and a card-based radio/computer. CECOM put some of its digital technology to the test in Haiti in spring 1995. Soldiers from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, equipped with commercial still and video cameras as well as the helmet-mounted "pencil camera" captured full-color digital images that were transmitted from the theater to the Pentagon nearly instantaneously via SINCGARS radio and commercial telephone.
To produce more affordable, more capable software for the Army, CECOM engineered the shift from stovepipe software systems (i.e., systems designed for specific applications) to generic, layered "architecture-based" systems, using off-the-shelf products and open system standards. The resulting demonstration project, Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems (STARS), improved software quality, reduced support costs by forty-nine percent, and abridged the time spent in software development and maintenance. The STARS project was one of twenty-four, selected from a field of 325 applicants, to receive the FY 95 Federal Technology Leadership Award.
The Armyís Common Operating Environment (ACOE) was an integrated architecture with standard, modular system and application support layers. The common computing infrastructure enabled disparate C2 systems to communicate and gave commanders the ability to tailor software applications to meet individual needs. The Army required that all new systems, as well as system modifications, use the ACOE. The ACOE requirement was one of a host of steps the Army took to get its C2 effort -- the Army Battle Command Systems (formerly the Army Tactical Command and Control System) back on track. Two ABCS components in particular -- the Maneuver Control System (MCS) and the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) highlighted the Armyís attempt to use commercial technology, standards, and substantial input from users to rejuvenate the ABCS.
Among other strikes against it, MCS had come under fire for not meeting user needs. The Army banked on software developed by the Battle Command Lab in tandem with Mystech (Falls Church, VA) to turn the program around. The new software development project to enhance the MCS, built upon technology developed for ASAS. Named "Phoenix," the new MCS software system featured a Windows-based user interface, tear-away menus, an icon builder, and the ability to run multiple applications simultaneously. The voice-activated system also provided common scaleable map displays, enemy and friendly force tracking, and desktop video teleconferencing. The Army put Phoenixís C2 capability to the test in Warrior Focus and Prairie Warrior. Upgrading of the ASAS to its Block II configuration also involved user input and technology experiments in the EXFOR, which gave components of a prototype ASAS software system, known as Warlord, a "good shakedown" in working together with more mature software.
Technology Applied to Logistics
The Logistics Anchor Desk(LAD), a CECOM-engineered Joint Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), linked computer workstations in a network that extended from Ramstein, Germany, to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to give soldiers an early glimpse of terrain in Bosnia and help them, thereby, plan the movement of supplies across an unfamiliar landscape. In essence, LAD allowed logisticians to do a "paper" reconnaissance well before the arrival of the first troops. The data itself was not new: the maps, for example, were all derived from other sources. What was new was the integration on a single platform of information and programs from many agencies and the dissemination of this information across the network to everyone who needed it. In addition to coordinating current data, the LAD could project deployment activities weeks into the future. Features included the Mapping and Analysis Tool for Transportation, video teleconferencing, and a Knowledge-Based Logistics Planning Shell (KBLPS) that did "what-if" analyses. USAREUR logistics coordinators used another LAD feature, Time-Phased Force Deployment Data, extensively during the deployment of troops to Bosnia. This utility allowed them to create and display a near term (twenty-day) projection (a pictorial representation) of future deployment activities.
Typically, planners used two LAD terminals side-by-side: one for tracking current data, the other for playing out the hypothetical analyses. To illustrate some of the systemís applications: By clicking on a series of icons, planners initiated a search to identify the number of kinds of Army tactical (mobile) bridges in Europe; they overlaid the results of the search on a map of Western Europe to show exactly where the bridges were. Hypothetically, at least, with links to Army supply centers and real-time updating of logistics information, LAD could provide "total asset visibility" of equipment in storage, in transit, and in the field. USAREUR used the KBLPS feature to plan the construction of base camps in Kaposvar, Hungary, a major staging point for the 1st Armored Division. According to Colonel Jim Paige, Director of the LAD ACTD:
USAREUR was trying to figure out how many people they had to feed or sleep in base camps, knowing 10,000 people would be clothed, housed, and fed over ĎXí amount of days. When you run the number through KBLPS, you donít have 10,000 people at any one time, you actually have 6,000. You donít have to buy as many beds.
That knowledge, by preliminary estimates, saved the Army more than $1 million. Meanwhile, at the Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, LAD operators used the KBLPS to track petroleum, oil, and lubricant usage in Bosnia in order to estimate the fuel requirements of allied forces by comparing them to similarly sized and equipped forces of the US.
CECOM initiated development of the LAD in 1994 as part of the Total Distribution ATD. The program became a Joint Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration when other services voiced an interest in its capabilities. CECOM fielded the LAD two years ahead of schedule to support operations in Bosnia. The LAD matured into a command and control system more quickly than expected. Logisticians installed a LAD workstation at Kaposvar on 15 March 1996 and were on track then to install yet another, on 28 March, at Task Force Eagle in Tuzla. Meanwhile, in real-world non-Bosnian applications, government employees employed LAD, following the crash of a charter airliner off the coast of the Dominican Republic, to support rescue planning by generating maps that depicted nearby air and seaports. And when a heavy storm severely damaged a prison security wall in Barbados, operators of the Atlantic Command employed a LAD feature, called the Global Logistics Awareness Display, to locate supplies of concertina wire available for immediate shipment.
In another "logistics power projection" initiative, CECOM engineers conceptualized and designed a state-of-the-art system for rapid distribution of software to the field in combat and other operational environments. Such a capability proved especially valuable to users in remote locations. Using this breakthrough technology, known as the Rapid Open Architecture Distribution System (ROADS), the Army could securely transmit a new software version electronically to a field site, where it could be replicated, distributed, and installed in on-site computers.
The CECOM Logistics and Readiness Center (LRC) achieved its self-defined vision, to become "The C4I Logistics Provider of Choice," and met the "Logistics Power Projection" objectives of AMCís strategic business plan by doing what it had always done and doing it extremely well.
To prove its pre-eminence in this regard, the LRC competed for and won the Presidentís Quality Improvement Prototype (QIP) Award for 1996.
Winning the competition was in itself a remarkable feat. The LRC application was one of eighteen in Department of the Army. A panel of twenty ranked these eighteen applications and forwarded the top six to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for the national competition. OPM selected ten finalist organizations from a field of thirty applicants representing all sectors of the government. It then subjected each finalist to on-site scrutiny by a team of quality experts from both the public and private sectors. This team thoroughly examined LRC operations, conducted in-depth interviews with all members of the Center's Executive Quality Council and randomly selected employees, viewed team meetings and demonstrations of LRC processes, and researched the LRC's back-up documentation. It judged the finalists not against one another, but in comparison to a pre-established standard of excellence. Although the OPM judges usually selected multiple winners -- they had the authority to select as many as two for the top prize and as many as six for runner-up honors -- for 1996 they chose only the CECOM LRC.
Created in 1988, the award program applied the same stringent standards used in the private-sector for the prestigious Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award. The intent was to recognize world-class organizations whose improvement efforts resulted in more effective use of the tax dollar and the delivery of higher quality products and services. The program promoted awareness of quality issues, spurred implementation of quality management practices in federal agencies, and gave these agencies working models by which to assess their own TQM progress. According to Tony Stevens, the LRC Quality Coordinator who spearheaded CECOMís application effort, "Winning the QIP puts us in a very distinguished group: since the award's creation, only three other Army organization have won, and none of those was a first-time submitter as we were."
The good news came in a surprise announcement by General Brohm during the farewell luncheon for Colonel Norman Southerland, who was Director of the LRC when it submitted its application. Brohm expected to receive the award in person from Vice President Albert Gore on 5 June 1996, during the Ninth Annual Conference on Federal Quality. "I am extremely proud of this award," he said:
It recognizes the superb management and work force as well as the technical excellence and outstanding customer service of our LRC organization. It is a fitting and well-deserved recognition of what the LRC and our entire command is contributing to the Army and our national defense.
The effort the LRC put into winning the Presidentís Award for Quality (PAQ) was indicative of the kinds of things the Center routinely did to achieve its major objectives. The quality competition involved intensive effort at all levels by members of the LRC Executive Quality Council, multi-functional teams, process action teams, and the LRC work force at large. Seven focus groups, one for each criterion of the competition, collected source data and drafted input. A "champion" from the Executive Quality Council led each group and made sure that all the required resources and support were on hand. Members of the focus groups, representing all the Centerís directorates, collaborated to give the application a center-wide perspective. Each group also had a facilitator who led meetings, gathered input from members and coordinated with the PAQ application manager. On learning that is was among the ten finalists, the LRC established a new team of "ambassadors" to accommodate the competitionís site examiners. Members of this team arranged for facilities, set up interviews, assembled back-up data, and served as guides. Then, having won the award, the LRC set up teams to develop a case study, a workshop, a videotape, and display booth for presentation at the forthcoming quality conference.
The QIP Award recognized CECOM for the application of practices and procedures that made it the Armyís most efficient, most responsive supplier of equipment and logistics support services. The superiority of CECOMís performance in this regard is reflected in key indices. CECOMís "stock availability" rate for FY 95 was 91.3 percent. Stock availability rates for the other four AMC logistics support organizations ranged from 82.1 percent for the Aviation and Troop Command to 90.0 percent for the Missile Command. The availability of critical "non-mission-capable" supplies in CECOM was 94.4 percent. In other AMC organizations, it ranged from 79.9 percent for the Aviation and Troop Command to 92.0 percent for the Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Agency (ACALA). CECOM back-orders as a percentage of demand was just 1.3 percent in FY 95. Other AMC organizations had backorder rates ranging from 2.4 percent (Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command) to 4.3 percent (Aviation and Troop Command). CECOM also had the lowest rates in AMC for Materiel Release Denials. Depots issued Materiel Release Denials when equipment tagged for release to users was missing components, was unavailable, or was damaged. CECOMís rate for FY 95 was 0.8 percent. The rate in other AMC organization ranged from 0.9 percent (ACALA) to 1.7 percent (Aviation and Troop Command). These indices were a direct reflection of a commandís proficiency in forecasting demand, purchasing stock, and keeping the depot inventory accurate.
Cost was another measure of efficiency. Each quarter, AMC computed the logistical operations support cost per item for each commodity command. For CECOM in FY 95, the cost per item was $2,297. The per-item costs of other AMC organizations ranged from $4,187 for ACALA to $8,512 for the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. While some of CECOMís advantage in this index could be attributed to "economies of scale" -- CECOM managed fully half of all the stock-numbered items in AMC -- it also reflected the LRCís aggressive search for ways to cover expenses, boost sales of products and services, and reduce operating costs.
Reduction of operating costs was more difficult in this era of Army retrenchment during which deactivating units turned back large quantities of equipment. To keep escalating inventory costs under control, CECOM took strong measures to "right-size" requirements and dispose of obsolete stock. CECOM managed to reduce the value of its depot inventory during this time from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $2.2 billion in 1995. Concurrently, the command reduced the value of "stock due in beyond requirements" from $24 million in 1993 to $12 million in 1995. When the amount of stock due in together with the amount on hand exceeded what the LRC thought it needed to meet the demand, the LRC had in effect bought too much or had bought it too soon, and this was costly to the government. The fifty percent ($12 million) reduction in the value of the excess stock reflected the LRCís aggressive approach to acquiring the right amount of the right equipment at the right time. This approach included innovative "just in time" acquisition strategies such a direct vendor delivery, packaged buys, omnibus contracting, and delegation of ordering authority to item managers.
Customer satisfaction was partly a product of the LRCís ability to deliver everything the customer ordered and to deliver it all at reasonable cost. But the timeliness of the delivery was also a factor. In this, once again, CECOM was an AMC leader. In partnership with the depots, the command shipped 89.4% of available stock on time in 1995, compared to 85.5 percent for the Missile Command (next best case) and 77.8 percent for the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (worst case). Reductions in the time it took the LRC to assemble provisioning requirements and procurement data packages and award contracts helped with the customer satisfaction index, as did a number of other specific improvement, as follows:
∑From its surveys, the LRC learned in 1992 that customers were unhappy having to wait eight hours or so for responses to inquires on the status of their requisitions. By 1995, with upgraded automation, LRC employees could answer questions about requisitions and deliveries while the customer was still on the phone.
∑With upgraded computer equipment, the Security Assistance Management Directorate was able to reduce acquisition processing times for foreign military sales by thirty percent. This shortened the lead time for deliveries and boosted total foreign sales to more than $1.6 billion in 1995, a ten percent increase over the previous year.
∑In formal partnership with Tobyhanna Army Depot, the LRC introduced into the depot a teaming concept that effectively reduced the time for preparing high-priority ships from 3.5 days to less than a day. Concurrently, it reduced the time for preparing routine shipments by more than two-thirds.
The LRC achievements and the methods the LRC employed to accomplish them are detailed in the appended document, "The LRC Story: Going Beyond Expectations," which was the cornerstone of the Centerís application for the 1996 Quality Improvement Program award. Among the particularly noteworthy deeds and ideas discussed in this document, see especially:
Teaming concepts, pp. 1(5), 4(2)-4(4), 5(3) and 5(6)-5(7)
LRC leadership in implementing anti-pollution measures, p. 1(8)
LRC service as quality consultant to other government agencies, p. 1(9)
Use of competitive comparisons and benchmarking, pp. 2(3)-2(4)
Development of a strategic business plan, pp. 3(1)-3(2)
Employee training, pp. 4(5)-4(7) and 6(6)
Logistics Assistance Representatives, p. 5(7)
Best Value contracting , p. 5(9)
Partnerships with industry, p. 5(10)-5(11)
Value engineering, p. 6(5)
Customer service, pp. 7(3) and 7(11)
Performance measures, pp. 7(6)-7(10)
Teaming for Change
In FY 96, the LRC revamped its structure totally to embody the teaming concept from the ground up, aiming ultimately to provide customers with "one stop" service while reducing staffing and coordination times for many processes previously shared by different directorates. A strategy to guide the move from a traditional hierarchical structure to a structure based on functionally integrated teams -- "LRC Ď97: Teaming for Change" -- emerged from numerous executive and work force planning sessions. It depicted the integration of the directorates of Materiel Management, Logistics and Maintenance, Systems Management, Product Integrity and Production Engineering, and Intelligence Materiel Management to constitute multi-disciplinary teams in three weapon system directorates and one consolidated Directorate for Logistics Engineering Operations. The schedule for implementing this reorganization purposely coincided with the BRAC-related relocation of the LRC from the CECOM Office Building in Tinton Falls to Main Post Fort Monmouth. The precept for forming integrated weapon system teams was to focus operations on specific customer groups and commodities, creating multi-functional environments in which workers of different disciplines would interact freely to ensure the highest level of customer satisfaction.
The LRC tested its teaming and empowerment concepts first at the Communications Security Logistics Activity (CSLA) in Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The centerís first director, James Skurka, set up the experiment there in 1990 to determine how effective wide-scale deployment of functionally integrated, self-managing teams could be. The CSLA teams were empowered to perform functions traditionally reserved for management: budgeting, training, setting of priorities, scheduling of work, appraising, rewarding, measuring, and disciplining. The test was a resounding success: by 1995 CSLA was a nationally recognized pioneer in the federal use of self-directed teams. It was a nominee for the Quality Improvement Prototype Award in both 1994 and 1995; in three consecutive years, its personnel addressed the Federal Quality Instituteís Annual Conference on Quality. Its director, Richard Dion, won the 1994 John W. Macy Award for excellence in the leadership of Army civilians.
The LRC initiated testing of the concept at Fort Monmouth in July 1995 with the formation of four prototype teams: Power Sources, Sensors, SINCGARS, and ASAS/CTIS. These teams, chartered under the direction of Tony LaPlaca, the centerís Associate Director, would provide "lesson learned" to help prepare the LRC for full scale reorganization in FY 96 and FY 97. The teams consisted of workers in all the pertinent LRC disciplines: item managers, quality assurance specialists, engineers, ILS managers, provisioners, technical writers, and catalogers. With the intent of breaking new ground in ways of conducting business, the prototype teams paid big dividends: they improved awareness of program needs, shortened mail routes, abridged formal staffing and documentation requirements, increased responsiveness to customers, and heightened job satisfaction.
The LRC had every expectation that full implementation of the concept would enable it to achieve its ultimate objective, which it stated bald-facedly in it application for the 1996 Quality Improvement Prototype Award:
We intend to be the lowest-cost providers of equipment in Department of Defense. This means that weíll manage more items with fewer resources. A strong business plan, coupled with out multi-disciplined teaming and continuous development of our people, will keep us moving in this direction.
Reducing the acquisition cycle was a top priority for the Army, especially in the realm of military electronics, where in the not-too-distant past most new communications and computer systems were nearly obsolete by the time they reached the field. It was as much a priority for General Brohm as it had been for his predecessor, General Guenther, and it remained a priority for General Guenther in his role as Army Director for Information Systems, Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4): "We're looking at a rapid action process," he said (1995), "where we identify key things we want to buy, they're brought to the board, decided on, and funded."
Guenther had been carrying the gauntlet of reform for the Army at least since the beginning of 1994. During the first week of January, as Commander of CECOM, he directed Victor Ferlise, his deputy, "to take a fresh look at procurement." Ferlise, in turn, invited the Directors of the three Centers, the Chief Counsel, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Deputy Director of Materiel Management to gather for a "brainstorming session." This group, to which the Command subsequently added representatives of the PEO community, constituted what came to be known as the "Fort Monmouth Acquisition Re-engineering Team."
There was at the time a sense of history in the making. "Our upcoming meeting on acquisition reform is of critical interest to both me and the CG," wrote Ferlise on 11 January 1994:
The CG sees this contribution as the pinnacle of his career as an acquisition officer. I believe we have a unique opportunity to advance revolutionary concepts in acquisition reform. Our creditability [sic] with higher headquarters has never been higher, and I am sure this will facilitate acceptance of our ideas.
Ferlise asked the invitees to come to the meeting prepared: they were each to meet with their best people to develop a one-page paper addressing the possibilities of reform in their own areas of expertise and, if they had not already done so, they were each to read a book by Michael Hammer and James Champy, Re-engineering the Corporation.
The session, held as scheduled on 18 January, produced a number of ideas:
∑Teaming On major procurements use an integrated team approach. Identify players up front and work together early in the requirements generation and definition process through the post award. The team would utilize concurrent engineering (parallel) principles and eliminate the current sequential "picket fence" process. Teaming would establish responsibility, reduce admin[istrative] (non-value added) functions, provide flexibility, and streamline/shorten the overall also process. Teaming would also eliminate reviews -- except for a senior level review.
∑Empowerment Item managers should have the authority to buy spares.
∑Information Technology Use advanced automation technology. Use wide area networks and the Electronic Bulletin Board, along with face to face contacts. Review the current acquisition data base. Permit all players, including PMs and contractors, access to data bases.
∑Flexible Contracts Increase the use of flexible contracts (ID/IQ, RQR).
Additionally, the meeting called for a re-examination of some existing practices -- the role of the competition advocate in the acquisition process, for example, and the policy of having Legal Office branch chiefs sign off on acquisition summary sheets to the Commanding General. The participants also briefly addressed the need to involve the community, through support to the Battle Labs, in the definition of requirements. The session closed with taskings to each of the participants and plans for a follow-up meeting in February.
Guenther shared some of these ideas with leaders of the Signal Center on 24 January 1994 at a Home-on-Home conference in Fort Gordon. He spoke first of the process improvement initiatives that were already in place at CECOM: Advanced Planning Briefings to Industry, omnibus contracting, professional development programs, the Commanding Generalís semi-annual conference with Chief Executive Officers, the Electronic Bulletin Board System, one-on-one sessions with prospective contractors, and the appointment of a non-developmental item (NDI) advocate. He then spoke of the challenge that faced the Army, quoting an October 1993 statement of John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology): "The process is in terrible shape. Itís not the result of past people having been either stupid or dishonest. Itís the result of an infinite number of regulations." Even so, said Guenther, the Army could not wait for the "Top" to change the laws: to meet the challenge, CECOM and its AMC counterparts had to re-engineer the process from the bottom up. Finally, he spoke of CECOMís response to the challenge: the constitution of the Acquisition Re-engineering Team and some of the ideas it brought to the table in its first meeting. In this he placed particular emphasis on use of an integrated team approach for major procurements.
The idea of an "integrated team approach" had been around for awhile. A TQM expert who sat in on the 18 January proceedings noted:
We could benefit from studying the lessons learned from our own [Communications Security Logistics Activity] at Fort Huachuca, which long ago formed teams organized around commodities and made them self-directed. We may not want to be that aggressive initially, but they [CSLA] can tell [us] about things like phasing in the concept [and] the types of people most likely to succeed in this environment.
And the SATCOM Project Manager employed an "integrated team approach" in the Special Project Office he established in October 1993 to shepherd CECOMís first "Pacer Procurement." The concept was not altogether new; nor were most of the other ideas broached in the Acquisition Re-engineering Teamís first meeting. Nevertheless, in the words of the TQM expert (Thomas Cameron), their implementation in most instances meant "a definite paradigm shift."
CECOM proved itself adept at shifting. An independent survey, performed toward the end of 1995 at the request of the Army Vice Chief of Staff, concluded that of all the Army's contracting organizations CECOMís was the most efficient. By all appearances, CECOM also led the Army in streamlining procurement services and implementing innovative contracting methods. Said Edward Elgart, Director of the CECOM Acquisition Center: "I also believe that we are the DOD leader." From the end of 1993 to the end of 1995, building on such initiatives as electronic contracting, omnibus contracting, pacer acquisitions, oral presentations, and use of ordering officers for Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, CECOM cut the average cycle time for procurement by about thirty-six percent.
Electronic Contracting (Paperless Procurement)
The Electronic Bulletin Board System (EBBS) permitted instantaneous communication between CECOM and more than 7,000 contractors; its use produced continuous, measurable reductions in the time required to place new contracts. CECOM launched its first paperless procurement in April 1992, when it used the EBBS to release solicitations for the engineering and manufacturing development of the Single Channel Anti-Jam Manpack Terminal (SCAMP) and the Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T). At the time, the EBBS had multiple "islands" operating with many different phone numbers and passwords; the second phase system, which came on line in mid-1994, had a single phone number and a single password and could accommodate concurrently as many as sixty-four users, twenty-two hours a day. As of that time (about May 1994), the Acquisition Center had processed eighteen to twenty additional solicitations through the EBBS. Its goal was to employ the system for all solicitations of more than $25,000. Other AMC organizations, following CECOMís, also issued electronic solicitations. Nevertheless, as of the end of February 1996, CECOM was the only command in the Army that used electronic solicitations for all (one hundred percent) of its mission procurements, and with successful receipt of a contractor's encrypted proposal, CECOM had already taken the next step in journey toward totally paper-free contracting.
"Omnibus Contracting" produced a less costly, less time-intensive approach to soliciting, awarding, and administering service contracts. Having identified related functions in each of three domains -- Business and Information Systems, Logistics and Readiness, and Research, Development, and Engineering -- a team of procurement specialists in the C3I Acquisition Center consolidated requirements so as to reduce the total number of service contracts required in CECOM, thereby reducing overhead and improving the efficiency of operations. The Center awarded the Computer Systems Development Corporation first contract under the Omnibus umbrella on 17 September 1993. This contract, for an estimated $24 million, provided CECOM's Corporate Information Directorate and its customers with support services for workplace automation and telecommunications. On 30 September 1993, the Center awarded the second Omnibus service contract to ARINC to support the Army Interoperability Network. Advantages of Omnibus Contracting included standardization of contractual documents (uniformity promoted clarity and elimination of ambiguity), reduction of contractor overhead expenses (fixed costs could be spread over a larger base), and reduction of government overhead costs (fewer contracts to administer). In addition to saving the government money, Omnibus contracting enabled users to obtain needed services in a matter of days with fewer resources than would be required to acquire the same services through separate contracts in a fully competitive acquisition environment. To promote uniformity and efficiency, the Acquisition Center established a single, centralized Omnibus Contracting Team. Before the inception of omnibus contracting, the Acquisition Center had jurisdiction for more than 125 major service contract. With omnibus contracting, the Center expected by the end of FY 96 to reduce this total to twenty-three (four valued at about $95 million for business information systems; five, at $200 million for logistics and readiness; and fourteen, at $1.4 billion for research and development).
The "packaged buy" concept was a similarly conceived innovation used in the procurement of spares and repair parts in which items of similar product technology and manufacturing processes were lumped together for acquisition from a single supplier through a single indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity type of contract. CECOM initiated its first "packaged buy" in [year].
The Ordering Officer Program
CECOM instituted its Ordering Officer Program in FY 94, once again setting a precedent in Department of the Army. In coordination with the LRCís Material Management Directorate, the Acquisition Center authorized seventeen item managers in the LRC to place delivery orders on high-volume, pre-priced contracts without the intermediation of any Contracting Officer. The Ordering Officer Program thereby established the item manager as the focal point for receiving and validating requirements, obtaining funding approval, and executing delivery. Wherever implemented, reduced administrative lead time, increased control over stockage levels, and freed Contracting Officers to work in other essential acquisition activities. Colleen Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, witnessed the first signing and execution of a delivery order by an Ordering Officer in June 1994. CECOM planned to employ the program in the future in all suitable indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity, pre-priced contracts.
One such contract was the contract CECOM awarded UNICOR in May 1994 for range quantities of 103 different items. In addition to the incorporation of the ordering officer concept, the contract benefited the command in the sense that it placed upon it no other obligation than to buy what it bought on the first delivery order (thirty-nine products valued at $4.2 million), but allowed it to buy up to the maximum quantity as many times as it wished during the life of the contract. CECOM awarded the second phase of this effort, for production of fifteen production valued at $1.9 million, in September 1994. Meanwhile, UNICOR assigned a full-time representative to CECOM to effect coordination between the command the various federal prison facilities, to supply updated status reports, to troubleshoot problems that might affect delivery of quality products, and to expedite deliveries required by exigencies.
With pre-priced IDIQ contracts, Ordering Officers in the LRC saved time and money in the procurement of sustainment materiel, and by ordering just what the Army needed just in time, they were able to reduce both the size of their depot inventories and the expense of storing these inventories.
With Pacer procurements, Fort Monmouth pioneered the use of what would later be known as Integrated Product Teams (IPT). Smart, experience people with authority to make decisions participated in all phases of the acquisition process, from the preparation of planning documents, system specifications, and the statement of work through the final selection of a winning contractor. With such people, CECOM could accomplish a major procurement in less than a hundred days. CECOM applied the Pacer concept initially in FY 94 in two high-visibility acquisitions: the Tri-Band Super High Frequency Tactical Satellite Terminal (TRIBAND) and the Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar (TESAR).
The Army needed the TRIBAND for its newly formed Power Projection Command, Control, and Communications (Power PAC3) Company. With TRIBAND, the Power PAC3 Company would support Army forces headquarters and liaison teams with critical beyond line-of-sight communications, quickly deployed for joint and combined task force operations. The Project Manager for Satellite Communications (PM SATCOM) received word of the requirement by telephone on 22 October 1993: the Signal Center wanted six prototype terminals on or before 30 September 1994. The Deputy Chief of Staff affirmed the requirement by memorandum to the DISC4, dated 7 January 1994.
When the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) in CECOM averaged 234 days, meeting the required delivery date, just 344 days from the initial telephonic request, required extraordinary measures. To speed procurement, Department of the Army directed the PM to procure the TRIBAND terminals on a non-developmental item (NDI) basis. The six prototypes were to use existing technology, and the winning bidder was to provide initial spares, depot-level maintenance, and field support for the five-year life of the system. Even so, the Acquisition Centerís first projected date for award of the contract was 30 June 1994. When the PEO insisted on an award on or before 31 March, the Acquisition Center and other elements of the CECOM matrix rallied to arrive at an award on 24 March, seven days ahead of schedule and more than three months ahead of the Acquisition Centerís initial estimate.
As a first step in achieving this feat, on 25 October 1993, the PM established a Special Project Office to shepherd the acquisition. Staffing of the office began with PM personnel and embedded matrix support components, but expanded quickly to include representatives of CECOM functional elements, including the RDEC, the LRC, the Legal Office, and the Acquisition Center. This team received high-level management support not only from the PM, the PEO, and CECOM, but also from the Signal Center and Army Staff. More significantly, rather than being motivated by functional requirements, the team focused on a goal: to deliver the product by 30 September. To this end, it adopted a "zero-based" requirements philosophy by virtue of which the team pushed matrix support elements to justify all the requirements they wanted included in the Request for Proposal (RFP) and other acquisition documents. Team leaders had the power to limit requirements, even to the point of discharging intransigent proponents. According to the PMís after action report:
The team enforced a "no business as usual" policy. ... Each time the bureaucratic process demanded an action, a document, or a deliverable that didnít make sense, the requester was asked why. "Boiler plate" input to the specification or S[tatement] O[f] W[ork] provided by the matrix was drastically tailored to fit the program. Leaves were delayed or canceled, duty hours extended to include nights and weekends.
The team also worked hard to make industry a player in the process. Frequent communication and industry input during the formative stages of the procurement data package helped ensure timely release of the solicitation. The PM posted each revision of the specification and the statement of work to the Electronic Bulletin Board and responded to industry comment on these revision usually within twenty-four hours. To further streamline the acquisition process, the team received authority to waive requirements, including requirements for internal review. During the pre-solicitation phase, it waived the requirement for an Operational Requirements Document. During the solicitation phase, it waived requirements as well for the Board of Solicitation Review, the Proposal Evaluation Adequacy Review, and the Contract Review Board. The presence on the team of functional representatives with authority to approve actions obviated the need for time-consuming committee reviews. It also shortened the time required for preparing essential documents. It took only five days to write the Source Selection Evaluation Plan, for example, because fully empowered representatives of all participating offices were part of the process. They could make changes "on the fly" without having to wait for approvals. Concurrently, the Product Integrity and Production Engineering Directorate established a "Superteam" to bypass the formal requirements of the Systems Data Review Board by working informally with the appropriate functional experts. The Superteam was also instrumental in reducing from forty-one to eleven the number of items in the Contract Data Requirements List. To accomplish this, it actively challenged the necessity of each item. To accelerate the assessment of performance risks (the PRAG process), the Special Project Office, using the Electronic Bulletin Board, asked bidders to submit draft PRAG information one month before the due date for submitting formal proposals. This request, dated 28 December, had a suspense date of 10 January, two days before the 12 January release of the solicitation. The Acquisition Center issued the Request for Proposal as a "paperless solicitation" on the Electronic Bulletin Board, just twenty-four hours after receiving the PMís procurement data package.
Anticipating the formal source selection process, the TRIBAND team informed potential bidders that they were to be evaluated on "key discriminators," that logistics would not be evaluated (instead, bidders were to be given a ceiling price for initial spares and maintenance support), and that technical proposals were to be limited in length to 100 pages. As a result, both the source selection plan and the proposals were more precise, and there were fewer "Items for Negotiation" arising from the proposals. Typically, a source selection generated between 250 and 300 items for negotiation (IFN) for each bidder, the resolution of which required two to three days of face-to-face negotiation. The IFN for the eight bidders in the TRIBAND acquisition ranged from twenty-five to forty-nine. The government team eliminated face-to-face negotiation and, so, cut at least three weeks from the programís PALT. It saved another two weeks (approximately) when it eliminated the Initial Competitive Range Determination that normally preceded release of the IFNs. When it sent out model contracts with its request for best and final offers, the Acquisition Center save the two or three days of administrative time usually associated with the signing of the contract after notification of the winner.
With all this, CECOM managed to award the TRIBAND contract in just 154 days. Just seventy-two days elapsed between the issue of the solicitation and the award, representing a seventy percent reduction in the commandís usual PALT. During the debriefing of unsuccessful bidders, 5 April 1994, there was a general consensus among them that CECOM had conducted the acquisition "very competently and professionally" and that the short acquisition cycle had been "very beneficial since bid and proposal costs were reduced."
The TESAR was the Army component of the joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program. The TESAR consisted of both ground and airborne subsystems, of which the latter made up the bulk of the UAV payload. PEO IEW managed Army participation, but the CECOM RDEC ran the TESAR Source Selection Evaluation Board. The urgency facing CECOM and the PEO in the TESAR acquisition stemmed from the need to supply the Navyís platform and data link contractors with the form, fit, and electrical/mechanical interface information they needed to meet their development schedules. Following the first publication of the procurement synopsis in Commerce Business Daily on 3 December 1993, CECOM had just ninety-eight days to award the TESAR contract. A contributing and/or complicating factor was the designation of the program as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). ACTD candidates had to have existing or maturing technologies with enough "off-the-shelf" stuff to yield a "fieldable brassboard" that had been examined in detail for doctrinal and tactical exploitation. As opposed to Advanced Technology Demonstrations, which were driven by the maturity of the underlying technologies, ACTDs were driven by their impact on military capability. User involvement was, therefore, critical to their success. Alternatively, ACTD designation brought with it the ability to abridge the early stages of the acquisition cycle, both by bypassing the concept exploration and definition phase and by the potential for abbreviating the engineering and manufacturing development phase. It also brought to the program strong support from the Department of Defense, assurance that senior leadership in the Army, CECOM, and Fort Monmouth would apply the resources the program needed to achieve its objectives on time, and freedom from the need to fulfill such formal requirements as the Operational Requirements Document, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and the ASARC process.
In local implementation, in addition to waiving the Operational Requirements Document and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the Product Manager exercised his authority to waive the requirement for a formal Systems Data Review Board. Instead, knowledgeable experts in the CECOM matrix performed informal reviews of various technical data elements, paring about sixty days from the programís pre-solicitation phase. Management also waived the requirement for review by the Senior Board of Solicitation and confined deliberations of the Source Selection Advisory Council to a single meeting.
From its inception, assumed to be the 16 August 1993 memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (RDA), to the release of the draft solicitation on 3 December, the acquisition took 109 days (vs. the usual time of one year). PALT, from the release of the solicitation to the award of the contract on 9 March 1994, took just ninety-six days (vs. six months). A key contributing factor was the early appointment of a Source Selection Evaluation Board, constituted of people who familiar both with the source selection process and the technical and programmatic aspects of the TESAR. In just six weeks, senior members of this Board prepared the programís statement of work, specification, acquisition plan, Justification and Approval, and Source Selection Evaluation Plan. This team also made good use of the Electronic Bulletin Board to speed communication with prospective bidders.
Although very different in kind -- the TESAR was an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration while the TRIBAND was primarily a systems integration effort -- the two programs had much in common. They both had backing at the highest levels in Department of the Army and above and full support of their PEO and the CECOM Commander. Program managers for the two system both had authority over a wide range of activities, as a result of which they were able to shorten the time their management chains spent in review and oversight. Early on, the managers of both programs recruited smart, experienced people for their teams and retained them through all phases of the acquisition, thereby ensuring continuity of corporate knowledge and easing the transition from one phase to the next: People who prepared the acquisition strategy, system specification, statement of work, source selection plan, and other such acquisition documents were major players, as well, in the source selection process. In both programs, the government teams developed and maintained close ties with industry. They met with industry prior to the release of their RFPs and encouraged prospective bidders to provide comment on and input to drafts of this document and the system specification. In communicating with industry, they both made extensive use of the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB). In all their activities, the Pacer acquisition teams examined the processes they employed in order to abridge the time needed for their execution. In both, they exercised their authority wherever feasible to eliminate unnecessary requirements and time-consuming internal reviews.
The Lead Time Reduction Red Team
Pacer (Integrate Product) Teams worked well in selected high-profile acquisition programs and might one day, when there were sufficient numbers of trained IPT professionals, become the Commandís usual method of contracting. In the meantime, to employ some of the Pacer processes in other, more traditionally structure acquisition programs, CECOM established a Lead Time Reduction Red Team. This team, organized in April 1995, implemented strategies for which it claimed a 102-day reduction in acquisition lead time between December 1994 and November 1995. It drew the preponderant proportion of its members from the Materiel Management Directorate but also had representatives from the Product Integrity and Production Engineering Directorate and the Acquisition Center.
The Red Teamís usual tool was the weapon systems reviews it conducted with item managers and their matrix support elements. The team reviewed the programs of forty-six weapon systems during its first seven months, analyzing data bases and acquisition strategies to identify ways of abridging cycle time. Reduction initiatives included, where appropriate, elimination or reduction of testing and inspection requirements; use of aggressive delivery schedules; maximum use of commercial specifications and standards; and the application of Value Engineering. The team also developed an on-line lead-time tracking system and a lead-time reduction bulletin board to keep the work force apprised of its actions and objectives. It estimated savings of $1.6 to $1.7 million for each day it cut from the Commandís average administrative and procurement lead time.
The Standardization Program Team
William J. Perryís June 1994 call for acquisition reform stipulated the use of industry standards and performance-based specifications in future procurements. His objective in eliminating specifications that were unique to the military and requirements that added no value was to free defense acquisition from constraints that made the development and procurement of materiel both difficult and expensive. This, in turn, accelerated use of state-of-the-art commercial technology in US weapon systems and promoted integration of the military and commercial industrial bases. The Army issued its plan for implementing Perryís initiatives in November 1994.
Implementation of the Army plan at Fort Monmouth entailed a "bottom up" review of all the specifications and standards used in the acquisition of military C-E equipment, with a view toward determining which of these documents were to be abolished, re-engineered, or retained. Disposition options included cancellation, inactivation pending development of a new design, replacement by a non-government or commercial standard, and conversion to a performance-based specification.
Local implementation also involved the organization of a multi-disciplinary team, known initially as the "Standardization Improvement Working Group," then as the Standardization Program Team (SPT). Charter members of the team included one action officer from each of three organizations -- the Program Executive Offices for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (PEO IEW), the Program Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communications Systems (PEO C3S), and the CECOM LRC. Associate members represented the LRC, the RDEC, the Safety Office, and the Acquisition Center. Kenneth Brockel, in his capacity as Principal Assistant for Specification and Standards Reform, functioned as senior advisor to the SPT. Fort Monmouth Standards Executives -- Bennet Hart (PEO C3S), Edward Blair (PEO IEW), and Colonel Norman K. Sutherland (LRC) -- approved the latest version of the SPTís Master Action Plan on 5 February 1996.
This plan outlined a strategy for accomplishing specification and standards reform through education, cultural change, an overhauling of the standards process, imposition of methods for identifying and eliminating excessive contract requirements, and the development of new management tools. With the concurrence of the Standards Executives, the SPT turned its attention to preparing a goal-oriented five year business plan, to enlarging the existing internal specification and standards reform training program, and to creating an informational "Home Page" for the program on the Internet. The SPT also initiated development of a local "roadshow" to introduce elements of the Master Action Plan to the work place, academia, and industry.
Training, Performance, and Commitment
It was more difficult to implement acquisition innovations than to imagine them. Implementation depended upon the existence of a responsive, well-trained work force. Knowing this, Elgart and his managers allocated fourteen percent of the Acquisition Center's non-payroll budget to professional development. They encouraged employees to continue their education and reimbursed them for expenses incurred in taking graduate and undergraduate courses. They implemented a cross-training/developmental assignment program in coordination with other components of Team Fort Monmouth.
As of February 1996, CECOM had inducted more than forty-five employees into this program, giving them opportunities to hone technical skills and improve their understanding of customer needs and processes. Developmental assignments, typically 120 days in length, met the needs of both the organization and the individual, as illustrated in the following examples:
An Acquisition Center branch chief trained in a program management position in a Program Executive Office. The branch chief brought back precious insight into the customerís support needs and viewpoints.
A procurement contracting officer trained in New York in Defense Contract Management Area Operations. He returned to CECOM with a better understanding of the relationships among pre- and post-award activities.
A legal advisor trained in the Materiel Management Directorate. He gained a better understanding of materiel management processes, and materiel management personnel gained appreciation for the legal aspects of their actions.
Another special program gave entry-level Army officers (captains and majors), who were well trained to be managers, the technical skills and experience base they needed to perform well in the Army acquisition arena. The program featured individually tailored training plans, developmental assignments, cross-functional experiences, and mentoring.
One measure of performance -- perhaps the key measure of performance for the Acquisition Center -- was timeliness of service. To measure performance, the Acquisition Center initiated a requirement that all its buying branches use Statistical Process Control charts for tracking various types of procurement in terms of Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT) and Administrative Lead Time (ALT). With Automated Procurement System (APS) 1-A Sheets, PALT and ALT counted the days for achieving each milestone in a procurement action and, so, identified the total amount of time required to achieve the action. Comparing actual performance to the baselines established for each milestone helped the Acquisition Center identify problem areas and areas of substandard performance. Performance anomalies invoked the preparation of corrective action plans that identified the reasons for the deviation or delay and, so, helped managers devise appropriate solutions including, for example, redistribution of resources and/or retraining of employees.
Training and other forms of acclimation produced results. Said Elgart (February 1996): "Our work force is creative, responsible, risk-taking, and accountable for owning their piece of mission achievement and customer satisfaction." The motto of the Acquisition Center, "Setting the PACE2," focused all its employees on a "Proactive Approach to Contracting Excellence through People, Automation, Continuous Process Improvement, and Education." With all this, the Acquisition Center set for itself the ambitious, but not unreachable goal of becoming a Centralized Defense Acquisition Center, whose employees able successfully to award and manage contracts for everything from batteries to bombers.
CECOM participated in every peace-keeping and humanitarian operation undertaken by the United States Army between February 1994 and April 1996. The CECOM Logistics Assistance Representatives were involved in all of them, supporting troops in their preparations for deployment, accompanying them to the field, and doing whatever they had to do there to keep their C-E equipment and systems operating. CECOM Item Managers filled requisitions for deployed and deploying units, often on an urgency basis, at an average rate well in excess of ninety percent. CECOM scientists and engineers devised effective solutions to technical and logistical problems encountered in the field.
The following examples illustrate the breadth and depth of CECOM support to Army operations.
The War on Drugs
To ensure visibility and maintain control over projects assigned by the AMC Counter-Drug Support Office, CECOM delegated "single focal point" responsibility to the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (Program Development Division). Personnel charged with executing this responsibility reviewed the projects received from national, state, county, and local counter-drug activities to ensure their assignment to and their timely execution by appropriate organizations within the command. Additionally, the division represented the command at quarterly in-process reviews at AMC and acted as its liaison in drug-control relations with Department of Defense, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and various law enforcement agencies. During FY 94, CECOM lent counter-drug organizations equipment valued at $7.1 million.
There were in FY 94 six on-going counter-drug programs involving CECOM: the Container Inspection System (state of art technology to generate high-resolution images of organic materials), the Counter-Narcotics Command and Management System (secure voice and data network to tie embassies in South and Central America to the Drug Enforcement Agency, the State Department, Department of Defense, and Southern Command), the Mobile Examination Demolition Van, Theater Gull (counter-narcotics correlation centers, remote sites, and intelligence networks in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama), evaluation of cellular phone intercept and direction finding equipment, and development of a prototype Mobile Non-Intrusive Inspection System.
In second quarter FY 94, CECOM issued a draft "CECOM Drug Interdiction Support Handbook" containing information on the products, services, and capabilities available in CECOM to law enforcement agencies and procedures for obtaining them.
Earthquake at Northridge
The CECOM Command and Control Center received the Defense Departmentís activation order for supporting victims of the Northridge earthquake on 18 January 1994. The Center monitored the operation until is closed on 14 February. During this time, CECOM supplied four VRC-12 radios for the operation and developed information on government contractors that were affected by the disaster.
In FY 94, the RDEC evaluated both fielded military and commercial infrared sensors in terrain and conditions similar to Somaliaís Mogadishu bypass main supply route. It determined that a number of three- to five-micron infrared cameras could reliably detect buried mines and mine clues. A RDEC test team traveled to Somalia where they demonstrated the camera and trained route clearing teams to use them. Meanwhile, responding to an urgent request in support of Operation Restore Hope, the RDEC designed, modeled, tested, produced, and deployed (all within less than sixty days) mine blast and direct fire protection kits for five-ton trucks. The kits dramatically improved crew survivability from mine blasts under the front wheels and cab of the vehicle. Also in support of operations in Somalia, as expressed by urgent requests from TRADOC and Department of Army headquarters, the RDEC supplied the 10th Mountain Division with four self-steering UHF satellite antenna systems. The RDEC designed and fabricated kits for installing these antennae on the divisionís vehicles.
On 22 July 1994, responding to AMC directive, the Telecommunications Center resumed twenty-four hour a day operations to support the Rwanda relief efforts. However, on 29 July, in view of low volume and limited staff, AMC authorized the CECOM Telecommunications Center to return to its usual operation schedule.
Nevertheless, as of 5 August 1994, the CECOM Command and Control Center was working twenty-four hours a day to provide proactive support for the humanitarian relief operation. CECOM had already deployed to East Africa six of its employees -- a legal officer, an INMARSAT/ADP NCO, and four Logistics Assistance Representatives -- and had processed for deployment two additional civilians, both with experience in supply. The command had received about fifteen requisitions for the operation, mostly for batteries, which it processed "off-line" to preclude shipping delays. During the following week, CECOM initiated action to supply steerable antennae and installation kits for the operationís M998 HMMWVs and to ascertain the availability of MST-20 radio sets. The SATCOM Project Office shipped the antennae and mounting kits on 17 August.
CECOM support of US forces that were to be committed to Operation Uphold Democracy began in early September 1994 with preparations to support forces that were poised for the forced entry in Haiti. One of the major tasks in this effort was the identification of personnel and equipment that were to be deployed to Haiti as part of the AMC Logistics Support Element (LSE). For the LSE, CECOMís Readiness Directorate built a deployable communications system, known as the LSE C2 Flyaway Package. This system, an assemblage of commercial and existing military equipment, arrived in theater with its three-man installation crew on 18 October 1994. Fully deployed in less than three days, it provided the Joint Logistics Support Command with service equivalent to that of a full-fledged commercial telephone system, and more. Captain Paul Fitzpatrick, who deployed to Haiti from CECOM as a public affairs officer, described the installation and operation of the system for readers of the Monmouth Message. His account is replicated below.
The CECOM Command and Control Center activated to provide round-the clock support to US and allied forces deployed for the operation at 1545h, 15 September 1994. At about 1900h, 16 September, the Center received a request from Fort Drum (10th Mountain Division) for five steerable antennae and mounting kits. With the cooperation of PM SATCOM, the Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate, and Transportation, the Center delivered this material to Fort Drum at 1100h, 18 September.
On 29 September 1994, two soldiers of the RDECís Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate -- Staff Sergeant Walter R. Padilla and Sergeant Kevin V. Thomas -- deployed with the first MILSTAR ground stations to be installed in a tactical theater. Weighing in at less that four hundred pounds in total, the three Single Channel Anti-Jam Man Portable terminals were operating with ninety-eight percent effectiveness the very day of their arrival in theater, providing secure communications between Joint Task Force Headquarters in Haiti and Headquarters of the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. The equipment, which was still in development, provided dependable tri-service communications twenty-four hours a day for more than a month until released from their mission with the arrival and installation of older, inventory communications systems.
The total number of personnel from CECOM and the Communications Systems Program Executive Office deployed to Haiti peaked in October 1994 at seventeen. As of the end of December, CECOM and other Fort Monmouth organizations had ten personnel deployed for the operation -- eight in Haiti and two at Fort Drum. During January, in conjunction with the transfer of the Haiti mission from the 10th Mountain Division to the 24th Infantry Division (Light), CECOM dispatched three additional LARs and one contractor (a GTE employee) to the theater.
Between 21 September 1994 and 31 January 1995, CECOM received 2,812 requisitions for equipment, supplies, and repair parts to support US forces in Haiti. It filled 2,571 (91%) of these requisitions.
When the first US troops deployed to Bosnia for Joint Endeavor, CECOM had already been involved for more than two and a half years in planning for and supporting US military operations in the Balkans. It participated in Operation Able Sentry, prepared estimates of the communications equipment needed to rearm Bosnian Muslim forces, and participated in advanced planning for large-force operations in both Bosnia and Croatia. From time to time, CECOM support involved the deployment of personnel, for example:
Responding to an AMC FAST request, RDEC supplied Task Force Able Sentry a long-range infrared surveillance capability for various observations posts along the Macedonian-Serbian border; it responded throughout the year to urgent requests for the technical and logistical support required to keep this equipment ready and operating. In May 1994, for example, CECOM dispatched two Night Vision personnel to install 2x extenders on several AN/TAS-6 night observation devices. The two men, one government employee and one contractor, arrived in Germany to assemble the devices on 25 May and moved on to Macedonia to install them on 1 June.
From 18 - 25 September 1994, Andrew Burbelo and John Tobias of the CECOM Safety Office paid a safety assistance visit to US Army units in Macedonia. They surveyed ten of eleven US-manned observation posts to identify improvements in lightning protection for their communications-electronics equipment. The two safety experts also provided the personnel who were there with general instruction in safety precautions during installation and use of electrical equipment. The AMC Logistics Assistance Office requested this on-site assistance in response to lightning accidents that had already rendered inoperative several of the communications systems used in these eleven observation posts.
Later, the command participated in preparations for Operation Daring Lion (the details of which were classified), and in October 1995 it participated in a NATO operation known as "Forceful Presence." At that juncture (the end of October 1995) the Software Engineering Directorate had prepared itself to deliver digitized maps of Bosnia; the Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Directorate was prepared to deploy Mini-RES, a miniature SIGINT system in two small packages that used FRIAR IV software, and was also prepared to support the Signals Warfare Project Manager in the deployment of the Guardrail/Common Sensor SIGINT system, along with a satellite remote relay; the Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate (S&TC) was ready to deploy the AV-2095 self-steering antennae needed for satellite communications from a moving vehicle; it was also prepared to develop HF frequency assignments for Bosnia based on ionospheric measurements collected on a daily basis by the National Institute of Geophysics in Rome, Italy; the LRCís Readiness Directorate had deployed the Log Anchor Desk (in coordination with S&TC and the Command, Control, and Systems Integration Directorate) and was prepared to deploy two LSE C2 flyaway packages and as many as twenty-four Logistics Assistance Representatives; GTE had accelerated the fielding of and training for a new MSE software release; the LRC was working with the Global Positioning System (GPS) Project Manager to accelerate the fielding of 3,622 enhanced Precision Lightweight GPS Receivers (PLGR) to selected USAREUR elements and was overseeing installation of 2,200 SINCGARS radios in vehicles of the 1st Armored Division; LRCís Systems Management Directorate had initiated plans to swap 110 AN/PPX-3B interrogator sets for the less reliable AN/PPX-3A interrogator sets in V Corps; to accomplish this latter action, Tobyhanna Army Depot and the LRCís Logistics and Maintenance Directorate were preparing to dispatch personnel to Europe; the Acquisition Center was negotiating with TRW and Electronics and Space, Inc., to extend contractor support for Guardrail/Common Sensor System 4 and its Advanced Quicklook equipment.
In its role as Executive Agent for Tactical Switched Systems, CECOM engaged in a variety of actions supporting Joint Endeavor. For example: To resolve compatibility problems between the AN/TYC-39 message switch and the British Ptarmigan store-and-forward switch, an RDEC team adapted an AUTODIN communications controller to provide a "handshake" between the two systems, thereby enabling communication between US and British troops. In early January CECOM hosted two days of interoperability testing and training for the 55th Signal Company, a combat camera unit that would deploy soon to the theater to acquire digital images from the battlefield, compress the images, and transmit them back to strategic command sites "in near-real time." According to reports of this action:
The test strings involved a Macintosh computer transmitting files through STU-IIIs with tactical DNVT adapters, KY-68 DSVTs, and CA-67 Tactical Terminal Adapters to tactical switching assets, back through a complimentary adapter (STU, 68, or 67) and terminated with another Macintosh acting as the receiver. The exercise provided the team critical tactical equipment experience prior to an anticipated Bosnian deployment.
Meanwhile, as Executive Agent, CECOM was receiving numerous requests regarding tactical applications of Motorolaís Network Encryption System (NES) which, though primarily a strategic device, was being used increasingly to solve tactical data separation issues such as, for example, the use of a common communications backbone to carry both US and Coalition data. CECOM tested several configurations using the NES in a tactical test bed to develop information for eventual communication to the joint community and incorporation into the Integrated Tactical/Strategic Data Network Quick Fix Userís Manual. Also as Executive Agent, CECOM began collecting information in response to many requests from the theater for information on the interoperability of US tactical systems with various commercial switching systems. By the end of March 1996, the Software Engineering Directorate had developed a new version of software for the TTC-39D Circuit Switch to fix a "toggling" problem in its interface with a KN-4100 DSN switch in Heidelberg and other problems identified by the Directorateís European Software Support Office.
The ubiquity of mines in Bosnia spurred the development of new mine detection and destruction technologies for which the RDECís Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate took the lead. Even before the deployment to Bosnia, the Directorate evaluated several countermine proposals and prepared to field to V Corpsís 16th Engineer Battalion four field-expedient countermine systems -- ground-penetrating radar that could be mounted on the front of a vehicle to detect buried, on-road, anti-personnel and anti-vehicular mines, hopefully before vehicle contact. Additionally, for use in Bosnia the RDEC delivered a prototype, remote controlled, vehicle-mounted mine detection system that consisted of a metal detector, an infrared camera, and the ability to transmit video to a control vehicle. The RDEC also fabricated and delivered vehicle mine protection kits for HMMWVs and five-ton vehicles, magnetic mine countermeasures equipment to overcome magnetic-influence mines, and a launched grapple hook for infantry use in clearing trip-wire mines.
Radio communications in the theater presented other unique problems for which CECOM supplied solutions. For example, in early March 1996 the Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate responded to an inquiry on the availability of equipment in the Army inventory that could be used as a radio relay to extend the range of the VRC-12, PRC-77, and PRC-126 VHF FM radios in Bosnia: the ruggedness of the terrain there limited the range of these line-of-sight systems. Engineers of the Directorate supplied instructions detailing the equipment and procedures needed for configuring both the VRC-12 and PRC-77 to accomplish the radio relay/retransmission function. They also noted that two PRC-126 radios could be used for relay if interconnected by a specially fabricated cable. Though this capability was not documented in the radioís manual and the cable was not in the Army inventory, S&TC personnel had the knowledge and ability to fabricate such a cable in-house on receipt of parts.
Operations in Bosnia also afforded the command opportunities to test new capabilities. Team Fort Monmouth deployed the Shortstop "electronic umbrella" in early February 1996. The Army initiated development of this system for use in Desert Storm, but that operation ended before the system could be deployed. Shortstop protected forces from enemy fire by creating an electronic field that essentially tricked the proximity fuses of incoming mortar and artillery shells to explode prematurely (i.e., several hundred meters away from their intended targets). In US-based field tests, the prototype system knocked out more than 5,000 incoming shells -- artillery and mortar rounds fired single and in barrages -- before they reached their targets, achieving a one hundred percent effectiveness rate. The system worked by first reading the setting of a proximity fuse, which determined how far above ground the incoming shell was supposed to detonate, and then by sending out signals to the fuse to make it think it has already reached its target. According to staff writers of Defense News, "The Armyís efforts to field Shortstop quickly shows a growing recognition that electronics will play a greater role on the future battlefield, especially with the trend for militaries to make dumb weapons like mortars smarter with electronic fuses."
CECOM was also instrumental in protecting airborne "targets." Thus, for example, when pilots operating in the Balkans reported a unidentified "threat," personnel of the CECOM Software Engineering Directorate developed an "unambiguous Threat Parameter List" for emitters programmed in the AN/APR-39ís Bosnia Mission Data Set. This list allowed pilots and Quickfix ELINT technicians to identify and locate the threat.
Other CECOM-related events of the Armyís Bosnian operations are listed below, in the "Chronology of CECOMís Joint Endeavor Support Actions" (Attachment 4).
By the end of February 1996, in support of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the CECOM Acquisition Center had awarded contracts valued at more than $16.5 million for state-of-the-art communications-electronics equipment and the field, engineering, and depot support of CECOM-supplied materiel. The fill-rate for Joint Endeavor requisitions approached ninety-six percent, as shown below:
CECOM Supply Actions for Joint Endeavor
Requisitions Received and Filled -- Cumulative
As of 18 January 1996, CECOM had eighteen of its LARs in the field supporting units engaged in Joint Endeavor, as follows:
Bourne 112th Signal Battalion in San Vito, Italy
Hagie 112th Signal Battalion in San Vito, Italy
Arron 333d Field Artillery in Tuzla, Bosnia
Cropp 25th Field Artillery in Tuzla, Bosnia
Garlanger 22d Signal Brigade in Tuzla, Bosnia
Kosut 22d Signal Brigade in Tuzla, Bosnia
Sray 22d Signal Brigade in Tuzla, Bosnia
Cox 22d Signal Brigade in Tuzla, Bosnia
Tulibacki 141st Signal Battalion in Tuzla, Bosnia
Muchmore 141st Signal Battalion in Tuzla, Bosnia
Dickinson 72d Signal Battalion in Zagreb, Croatia
Martinchek 72d Signal Battalion in Zagreb, Croatia
Faux 501st Military Intelligence Battalion in Taszar, Hungary
Eder 1st Military Intelligence Battalion in Taszar, Hungary
Gould 44th Signal Battalion in Kaspovar, Hungary
Gumbinger 4th Brigade in Kaspovar, Hungary
Graham 17th Signal Battalion in Zupanja, Croatia
Wagner B Battery, 25th TAB in Sarajevo, Croatia
The Logistics Assistance Office (21st TAACOM - Forward) reported on 4 January 1996:
The slow movement is really taking its toll. The number of personnel here has doubled the amount that was previously planned. The LARs find it frustrating because none of the maint[enance] shops (organization or direct support) are set up and have the available space to accommodate them. This has had no effect on their performance and it shows how dedicated they are to the program and the mission accomplishment.
In addition, as of 18 January, CECOM had five GTE employees in Tuzla and one in Kaspovar to support MSE and another six, employed by various contractors, to support IEW systems in theater. Altogether as of that date, there were two military, twenty-seven civilians, and twenty-one contractors in Europe to support Joint Endeavor. By 4 April, the number of GTE personnel in Tuzla had grown to seven, and there were twelve CECOM LARs in Bosnia, four in Croatia, and two in Hungary. Lack of maintenance shops was no longer a problem at that date, but LARs in theater were constrained by convoy and vehicle restrictions to which contractors were not subjected. With a "protecting the turf" kind of pride their work, LARs complained that on several occasions that contractors had gone directly to LARs-supported units before they themselves could get there to provide assistance.
Portraits and Biographies
Major General Otto J. Guenther
Major General Gerard P. Brohm
The LRC Story:
Going Beyond Expectations
Captain Paul Fitzpatrick
Telecommunications for Haiti
Chronology of CECOM
Joint Endeavor Support Actions
Chronology of CECOM Joint Endeavor Support Actions
Week of 21 December:
SINCGARS: Materiel Fielding Team sent to Fort Bragg to field thirty-four radios to the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.
Flyaway Package: Contractors departed for Germany to repair satellite earth station; funding received to purchase the space segment.
COMSEC: Account and keying material deployed to Bosnia.
TROJAN: Government and contractor personnel deployed to provide architectural engineering interface support of connectivity with first-time deployed JMICS/JSTARS Ground Station Modules.
AB-1309 Expandable Antenna Mast: Contracted with Tri-Ex for deployment of maintenance and repair personnel.
Week of 28 December
SINCGARS: Fielding completed to all priority 1-4 units.
REMBASS: Systems Management Directorate coordinated transfer to USAREUR of five GSQ-187 Sensor Monitoring Sets (from USARPAC) and nineteen PSQ-7 Monitor Programmers (from FORSCOM); Materiel Management filled USAREUR-funded requisitions for 259 REMBASS secondary items and 1,600 lithium batteries.
Depot Maintenance: CECOM forwarded list of eleven items that would require USAREUR funding of $3.1 million for depot maintenance.
FLIR: NVESD provided 2d Division USMC with a PC-based FLIR training program covering target acquisition and search routines.
Trojan SPIRIT II: IEWD working with ISC and INSCOM coordinated planning actions with DA and USAREUR for deploying the system to Bosnia.
AN/PRC-138. Contracted with Harris to supply ten non-standard PRC-138 HF/VHF manpack transceivers, ancillary equipment, and training to support Poland in its Bosnian peace-keeping mission.
Firefinder: CW4 Michael Courson dispatched to Germany to support Firefinder in 1st Armored Division Artillery.
Week of 4 January
AN/TRC-190. Assemblage exploded at Zupanja on the Sava River, Bosnia; cause undetermined.
Guardrail: Guardrail/Common Sensor System 4 deployed from Wiesbaden to Taszar Airfield (Kaposvar, Hungary); PM and CECOM assembled team to provide technical and logistical support.
Contracts awarded for in-theater support of Guardrail (TELOS) and ASAS (ILEX).
Week of 11 January
Firefinder: Sacramento Air Logistics Center shipped replacement for non-mission capable AN/TPQ-36 at Tuzla Air Base.
ASAS: Contractor personnel deployed to Kaposvar to support the system at USAREUR Forward Command Post.
Week of 18 January
GPS: New Equipment Training Team dispatched to Germany to conduct training for the Enhanced Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver; NET Team Chief Reid departed (19 Jan) to provide training on the Stand Alone Air GPS Receiver in Germany, Croatia, Turkey, Cypress, Bosnia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Italy.
Week of 25 January
AN/TRC-190. Replacement for exploded system sent.
Week of 1 February
JSTARS: Contracted with Motorola for field support of twelve JSTARS Ground Station Modules employed in support of Joint Endeavor.
Week of 8 February
Trojan SPIRIT II. Eight system deployed in theater; a ninth en route with the 110th Military Intelligence Battalion.
LSE Flyaway Package: In operations (as of 2 February) with the S-250 version at Tuzla and the camper version at Kaposvar, each manned by two CECOM personnel.
Total Asset Visibility: Contract awarded SAVI for docking tags and engineering services to install same on military equipment. Tags emitted radio frequencies to permit tracking by systems being emplaced in Europe.
INMARSAT: Three terminals dispatched to Europe from Fort Monmouth.
Week of 15 February
AN/APR-39: NVESD upgraded the APR-39 Radar Warning Receiver of an ARL-I aircraft subsequently deployed to Bosnia.
Shortstop: Fielding team began conducting in-theater training.
Week of 29 February
GPS: Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver training completed -- twenty-four classes, 436 students; trainers return to CONUS.
Week of 8 March
Night Vision: NV&ESD shipped "range monitoring equipment" to the 7th Army Training Command to set up a forward training area in Hungary for troops stationed in Bosnia
Countermines: Acquired 102 titanium mine probes from Mission Knives, Inc., San Juan Capistrano, CA.
Shortstop: Units complain about fielding and training insufficiencies; say that systems were not operating according to instructions received during NET.
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Date Last Modified: May 13, 2004